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I. INTRODUCTION 
“When there’s an elephant in the room, introduce him.”1 
 
In Knick v. Township of Scott,2 the Supreme Court corrected one of 
the most egregious and inexplicable blunders of its 230-year history. 
For more than three decades, plaintiffs who alleged a violation of the 
Takings Clause by state or local governments were barred from suing 
for compensation in federal court.3 The source of this prohibition was 
Justice Blackmun’s 1985 opinion in Williamson County Regional 
Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City4—a decision 
that most scholars and practitioners believe rested on a fundamental 
misunderstanding of both constitutional text and legal procedure.5   
Williamson County was not only doctrinally indefensible, but the 
Court that handed down the decision apparently failed to grasp its 
procedural implications. Although the opinion was rife with language 
suggesting that a Fifth Amendment takings claim could be “ripened” 
for federal litigation by first seeking just compensation in state court, 
complying with that requirement would in fact bar the plaintiff from 
pursuing the claim further in any forum, state or federal.6 It took the 
Court twenty years to acknowledge this self-evident, procedural catch-
22 and over a decade to remedy it by overruling Williamson County.7 
 
 1. AZ QUOTES, https://www.azquotes.com/quote/364227 (last visited Feb. 26, 
2021) [https://perma.cc/7EYP-ZMX4] (citing Carnegie Mellon University, Randy 
Pausch Last Lecture: Achieving Your Childhood Dreams, YOUTUBE (Dec. 20, 
2007), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ji5_MqicxSo [https://perma.cc/QAW9-
FT93]). 
 2. 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2162 (2019). 
 3. The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution provides, “nor shall private property be taken for public use, without 
just compensation.” U.S. CONST. amend. V. This provision was incorporated into 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment for application to state and 
local governments by Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. City of 
Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897). 
 4. See Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson 
City, 473 U.S. 172, 172 (1985).  
 5. See infra note 53. 
 6. See Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 194 (it was “premature” to file takings 
claim in federal court before seeking compensation in state court); id. at 197 (federal-
court takings claim is “not yet ripe” until plaintiff has sued for compensation in state 
court).  
 7. See San Remo Hotel v. City and County of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, 325 
(2005) (acknowledging that complying with Williamson County could not “ripen” a 
takings claim for federal adjudication, as the decision stated); See Knick v. Twp. of 
Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2167 (overruling Williamson County).   
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Throughout the thirty-four-year history of Williamson County, one 
fact was taken for granted. Never directly mentioned but always 
looming in the background of two rounds of oral argument before the 
Supreme Court in Knick was the premise that relegating takings claims 
to state court made it less likely that property owners would prevail on 
those claims than if they could be filed in federal court in the first 
instance. This Article examines that premise and finds little support 
for it in the historical record. 
Part I of this Article discusses Williamson County and highlights the 
logical, doctrinal, and procedural confusion associated with the 
opinion, both in its conception and as the consequences of the ruling 
were revealed over time.8 It concludes with a brief review of the Knick 
decision, which finally laid Williamson County to rest.9 Part II turns to 
the “elephant in the courtroom”—the generally unspoken assumption 
that reopening the federal courthouse doors to takings claims will 
significantly increase the number of claims that result in awards of 
compensation.10 Part II also points out that, both before Williamson 
County and after, federal courts have expressed a strong distaste, if not 
outright contempt, for becoming involved in land-use disputes.11 A 
review of the pre-Williamson County practice of invoking abstention 
to clear the federal judiciary’s calendar of takings cases12 is followed 
by an examination of the extremely low success rate of takings cases 
that have managed to avoid both Williamson County and abstention 
and adjudicated on their merits in federal court.13 A case study of 
Guggenheim v. City of Goleta14 exemplifies the Ninth Circuit’s policy 
of dismissing takings challenges to regulations that predate a 
plaintiff’s acquisition of title—in direct contravention of the Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island.15 Finally, the Ninth 
Circuit’s most recent foray into takings law, Bridge Aina Le’a v. State 
of Hawaii Land-Use Commission,16 raises the question of whether the 
Circuit is flouting the Seventh Amendment’s Re-examination Clause 
 
 8. See infra notes 19–71 and accompanying text. 
 9. See infra notes 72–92 and accompanying text. 
 10. See infra notes 93–117 and accompanying text. 
 11. See infra notes 118–29 and accompanying text. 
 12. See infra notes 130–65 and accompanying text. 
 13. See infra notes 166–193 and accompanying text. 
 14. Guggenheim v. City of Goleta, 582 F.3d 996, 1037 (9th Cir. 2009) 
[hereinafter Guggenheim I], vacated on reh’g en banc, Guggenheim v. City of 
Goleta, 638 F.3d 1111, 1111 (9th Cir. 2010) [hereinafter Guggenheim II]. 
 15. 533 U.S. 606, 629 (2001); see infra notes 194–217 and accompanying text. 
 16. 950 F.3d 610 (9th Cir. 2020), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. July 22, 2020) 
(No. 20-54). 
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in its eagerness to set aside jury verdicts of takings liability.17 Part IV 
concludes this Article by reminding the reader that Knick has 
essentially returned federal takings jurisprudence to where it stood in 
1984—before Williamson County cut off its development by diverting 
most takings cases to state court.18 How the federal judiciary responds 
to the Knick challenge will set the parameters of takings law for the 
twenty-first century. 
II. THE THIRTY-YEAR MISTAKE 
A. Williamson County—Laying a Minefield Without a Map 
The Williamson County opinion was unique in many respects. The 
Court did not decide the question presented for review. The question 
the Court decided had not been briefed or argued below; the Court was 
unable to find a coherent rationale for its holding, and no one had 
thought through the readily foreseeable consequences of the decision. 
The case arose after the denial of permits by the Williamson County 
Regional Planning Commission that were required to complete the 
development of a residential subdivision.19 Hamilton Bank, which had 
acquired title to the project through foreclosure, sued the agency in 
federal court for a regulatory taking of the undeveloped property and 
was awarded compensation by a jury.20 The trial judge overturned the 
damages award, but the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reinstated the 
award, holding that just compensation was required for even a 
temporary denial of all beneficial use of property.21 The Supreme 
Court granted certiorari to address the question of whether federal, 
state, and local governments must pay money damages to a landowner 
whose property was allegedly “taken” temporarily by the application 
of government regulations.22 This question, however, was not 
addressed.23 Instead, the Court created a novel “ripeness” doctrine out 
 
 17. See infra notes 218–47 and accompanying text. 
 18. See infra notes 248–51 and accompanying text. 
 19. Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 
473 U.S. 172, 180 (1985). 
 20. Id. at 175. 
 21. Id.; Hamilton Bank of Johnson City v. Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Planning 
Comm’n, 729 F.2d 402, 409 (6th Cir. 1984), rev’d, 473 U.S. 172 (1985). 
 22. Williamson Cty., 473 U.S. at 185. 
 23. Id. (“[W]e find that the question is not properly presented, and must be left 
for another day.”) That day came two years later, in First English Evangelical 
Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 321 (1987). 
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of whole cloth—under which the federal courts could not hear 
Hamilton Bank’s Fifth Amendment takings claim at all.  
As a prelude, the majority found that the claim was not ripe for 
adjudication because the developer had “not yet obtained a final 
decision regarding the application of the zoning ordinance and 
subdivision regulations to its property.”24 This first prong of 
Williamson County’s new ripeness doctrine, the “finality” 
requirement, unleashed a torrent of chaos and unpredictability into 
takings law that persists to this day despite three subsequent Supreme 
Court opinions attempting to clarify exactly what constitutes “finality” 
on a case-by-case basis.25 The opinion’s inherent obscurity as to when 
a land-use decision may be sufficiently final to create a ripe takings 
claim has been further clouded by the courts, which have sometimes 
seemed eager to create new procedural stumbling blocks to avoid 
adjudicating such claims on the merits.26 An especially egregious 
example was a ruling by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals that an 
agency’s outright prohibition of any economically beneficial use of 
property was not “final” until the aggrieved property owners tried to 
amend the regional land-use plan to accommodate development.27  
Nevertheless, all the difficulties and uncertainties that were 
generated by Williamson County’s finality requirement paled in 
comparison to what came next. Having seemingly concluded his 
analysis of why Hamilton Bank’s takings claim was not ripe, Justice 
Blackmun continued by stating, “A second reason the taking claim is 
 
 24. Williamson Cty., 473 U.S. at 186. This was a puzzling statement, given that 
Hamilton Bank had received a determination from the County Board of Zoning 
Appeals that it was entitled to proceed with its development as originally planned. 
However, “[the Regional] Planning Commission [had] refused to acknowledge that 
decision. The County Attorney advised Hamilton Bank that any further resort to the 
Board of Zoning Appeals would be futile, as the Planning Commission would ignore 
its determination.” Michael M. Berger, Anarchy Reigns Supreme, 29 WASH. U. J. 
URB. & CONTEMP. L. 39, 53 (1985).. 
 25. See MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo Cty., 477 U.S. 340, 351–53 
(1986) (holding that a property owner who is denied approval of development 
allowed under existing regulations must seek approval for less intensive uses); 
Suitum v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 739 (1997) (holding that an 
agency’s decision is final when it has no further discretion to approve permit); City 
of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, 526 U.S. 687, 698–99 (1999) 
(holding that the government may not impose repetitive or unfair procedures in order 
to avoid reaching a final decision). 
 26. See generally, Gregory Overstreet, The Ripeness Doctrine of the Taking 
Clause: A Survey of Decisions Showing Just How Far Federal Courts Will Go to 
Avoid Adjudicating Land Use Cases, 10 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 91, 124 (1994). 
 27. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 911 F.2d 1331, 
1336 (9th Cir. 1990). 
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not yet ripe is that respondent did not seek compensation through the 
procedures the state provided for doing so.”28  
This was a startling proposition that had never before been 
suggested by any court and had not been considered by the Sixth 
Circuit or the district court proceedings in Williamson County.29 The 
sole basis for this novel, procedural rule was an amicus brief the 
Solicitor General filed in the Supreme Court, which posed the 
question: 
 
Whether, under this Court’s decision in Parratt v. 
Taylor . . . respondents claim that its property was 
taken without just compensation in violation of the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments should have been 
dismissed because respondent did not pursue 
procedures under state law to obtain compensation or 
show that those procedures are inadequate.30 
 
In Parratt, an inmate at a Nebraska prison ordered hobby materials 
through the mail, which were delivered to the prison but disappeared 
before reaching him.31 The inmate sued the warden, alleging that the 
loss of the materials amounted to an unconstitutional deprivation of 
 
 28. Williamson Cty., 473 U.S. at 194. Although Justice Blackmun’s opinion 
requires litigants to avail themselves of any “procedures” a state might make 
available for obtaining compensation, this has been universally interpreted narrowly 
as a requirement to file an inverse condemnation claim or its equivalent under state 
law, in state court. See, e.g., Knick v. Twp. of Scott, Pa., 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2169 
(characterizing the holding in Williamson County as requiring property owners to 
“seek just compensation under state law in state court before bringing a federal 
takings claim”); San Remo Hotel v. City of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, 331 
(“Because petitioners had failed to pursue an inverse condemnation action in state 
court, they had not yet been denied just compensation as contemplated by 
Williamson County.”). 
 29. See, e.g., Joshua D. Hawley, The Beginning of the End? Horne v. Department 
of Agriculture and the Future of Williamson County, 2013 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 245, 
246 (“[I]n no case before Williamson County did any federal or state court ever 
suggest that it lacked jurisdiction to hear a takings claim, or that the claim was 
somehow premature, merely because the claimant had not yet attempted to obtain 
compensation from the government.”). 
 30. Brief for the U.S. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Williamson Cty. 
Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 172 (1985) (No. 84-4), 
1984 WL 565763 *1. Such a rule had previously been suggested (albeit without 
analogizing to Parratt) in a law review article by William Ryckman, but there is no 
evidence that either the Solicitor General or the Williamson County Court were 
familiar with it. See William E. Ryckman, Jr., Land Use Litigation, Federal 
Jurisdiction and the Abstention Doctrines, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 377, 395 n.104 (1981). 
 31. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 529 (1981). 
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property without due process of law.32 The Supreme Court ruled that 
the inmate’s due process rights were not violated because the loss of 
his materials resulted from the “random and unauthorized” acts of the 
prison’s employees, rather than from any established procedure.33 
Because Nebraska tort law provided a means to recover the value of 
the lost property, there was no due process violation.34 
It was immediately evident that the formal denial of development 
permits in Williamson County had nothing to do with due process, nor 
could it plausibly have been described as a random and unauthorized 
act. Hamilton Bank’s opposition brief highlighted the Solicitor 
General’s faulty analogy between takings cases and the issue posed by 
Parratt. The brief noted that because regulatory takings effected by 
land-use agencies usually occur only after lengthy formal proceedings, 
Parratt was clearly inapposite, and there was no logical bar to 
immediately seek a remedy for the constitutional violation in federal 
court.35 At one point, Justice Blackmun’s majority opinion seemed to 
recognize the inapplicability of Parratt, noting that the Parratt rule 
“does not extend to situations . . . in which the deprivation of property 
is effected pursuant to an established state policy or procedure, and the 
state could provide pre-deprivation process.”36 Yet even after this 
concession, the opinion insisted that “Parratt’s reasoning applies here 
by analogy.”37 
The only other precedential basis that Williamson County could 
claim for the new “state procedures” requirement was by analogy to 
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,38 which Justice Blackmun cited for the 
proposition that “takings claims against the federal government are 
premature until the property owner has availed itself of the process 
provided by the Tucker Act.”39 But this reflected an even deeper 
misunderstanding of takings law than the reliance on Parratt. In 
Monsanto, a titular chemical company sought to enjoin, under the 
Takings Clause, provisions of a federal law that would result in the 
 
 32. Id.  
 33. Id. at 541. 
 34. Id. at 543–44. 
 35. Brief for Respondent Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, Williamson Cty. Reg’l 
Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985) (No. 84-
4), 1984 WL 565756, at *39. 
 36. Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 
473 U.S. 172, 196 n. 14 (1985). 
 37. Id. 
 38. 467 U.S. 986, 986 (1984). 
 39. Williamson Cty., 473 U.S. at 195 (citing Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1016–20). 
  
584 TEXAS A&M J. PROP. L. [Vol. 7 
 
disclosure of certain trade secrets.40 The Court found that the data in 
question qualified as private property, protected by the Fifth 
Amendment.41 However, the equitable relief that Monsanto sought 
was not available to enjoin a taking by the federal government; 
Monsanto’s exclusive remedy was to file suit for just compensation in 
the Court of Federal Claims, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (the 
“Tucker Act”).42 Thus, Monsanto’s claim for equitable relief was not 
“premature” in the ordinary sense of the word. Williamson County’s 
reliance on Monsanto was clearly intended to suggest, as noted at the 
time, “that suit in the [Court of Federal Claims] is some kind of 
precondition to suit in district court.”43 But the Court of Federal 
Claims is the only forum with jurisdiction to hear takings claims 
against the federal government in excess of $10,000.44 Monsanto’s 
claim was not barred for being premature; the claim was barred 
because the company failed to do what the plaintiff in Williamson 
County did—seek just compensation in a federal court with 
jurisdiction over the claim. 
Stripped of the inapt analogies to Parratt and Monsanto, the only 
support for the state litigation requirement was Justice Blackmun’s 
self-evident, yet seemingly vacuous, observation that “[t]he Fifth 
Amendment does not proscribe the taking of property; it proscribes 
taking without just compensation.”45 Obviously, plaintiffs do not bring 
suit for a violation of the Takings Clause unless they can allege a 
taking without just compensation; that is the gravamen of the 
complaint. The Court in Williamson County chose to address the 
following question: What is the proper court to adjudicate takings 
claims? Justice Blackmun’s tautological recitation of the 
constitutional text sheds no light whatsoever on that issue.46 Justice 
Blackmun only provides the following insight:  
 
 40. Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 998–99. 
 41. Id. at 1001–1004. 
 42. Id. at 1016–1019. 
 43. Berger, supra note 24, at 57. 
 44. The Tucker Act assigns to the Court of Federal Claims jurisdiction over “any 
claim against the United States founded upon . . . the Constitution,” 28 
U.S.C. 1491(a)(1) (2011), and this jurisdiction is exclusive for claims over $10,000. 
28 U.S.C. 1346(a)(2) (2013). 
 45. Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 
473 U.S. 172, 194 (1985). 
 46. See, e.g., John Martinez & Karen L. Martinez, A Prudential Theory for 
Providing a Forum for Federal Takings Claims, 36 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 445, 
460 (2001) (“[I]t makes sense that a claimant must ask for and be denied 
compensation before the judicial machinery may be mobilized to determine whether 
the government has violated the Just Compensation Clause. However, the person 
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The key to this logical puzzle apparently lies in the 
opinion’s assertion that [B]ecause the Constitution 
does not require pre-taking compensation and is 
instead satisfied by a reasonable and adequate 
provision for obtaining compensation after the taking, 
the State’s action here is not “complete” until the State 
fails to provide adequate compensation for the taking.47 
 
By referring to both the county planning commission and the 
Tennessee state courts as “the State”, Justice Blackmun implied some 
sort of functional identity between the agency committing the taking 
(the commission) and a possible source of a compensation remedy (the 
state judiciary). But the identification of the two public entities is 
plainly spurious.48 In most cases, as in Williamson County, takings are 
effected by actions of the executive branch of the local government—
city or county boards and commissions.49 These entities are legally, 
functionally, and fiscally distinct from the judicial branch. If Hamilton 
Bank prevailed in a state, inverse condemnation action against the 
regional planning commission, the state court would not provide 
compensation.50 Rather, the state court would order the commission to 
 
from whom, or entity from which, the claimant should request compensation, and in 
what forum, remain undetermined.”).   
 47. Williamson Cty., 473 U.S. at 195 (emphasis added).  
 48. As Luke Wake has noted, “under this interpretive theory, state courts were 
viewed as active participants in facilitating a constitutional violation.” Luke A. 
Wake, Righting a Wrong: Assessing the Implications of Knick v. Township of Scott, 
14 CHARLESTON L. REV. 205, 217 (forthcoming, Winter 2020). Viewed differently, 
Williamson County treated local governments as though they were mere appendages 
of state government. See Robert H. Thomas, Sublimating Home Rule and Municipal 
Separation of Powers in Knick v. Township of Scott, 47 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 509, 
512–13 (2020).  
 49. See, e.g., Michael B. Kent, Jr., Weakening the “Ripeness Trap” for Federal 
Takings Claims: Sansotta v. Town of Nags Head and Town of Nags Head v. 
Toloczko, 65 S.C. L. REV. 935, 945 (2014) (“[I]n most cases, the ‘government’ will 
be the state or local agency doing the alleged taking. The state judicial system, by 
contrast, provides a forum to remedy the uncompensated taking, just like a federal 
court does.”) (footnote omitted). 
 50. For purposes of this hypothetical, we leave aside the fact that inverse 
condemnation was not available under Tennessee state law, as Hamilton Bank 
informed the Court at the time. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Williamson Cty. 
Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985) 
(No. 84-4), 1985 U.S. TRANS LEXIS 76, at 16–18. Compensation for a regulatory 
taking under Tennessee state law would not be available until nearly 30 years after 
Williamson County. See Phillips v. Montgomery Cty., 442 S.W.3d 233, 242–44 
(Tenn. 2014).  
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do so—exactly as a federal court would and, in fact, did. If the 
foregoing passage in Williamson County read, “the planning 
commission’s action here is not ‘complete’ until the Tennessee state 
courts fail to order it to provide adequate compensation for the taking,” 
the non sequitur would have been obvious. A taking without just 
compensation occurred when the commission denied permits to 
develop the property and failed to provide compensation for the 
owner’s loss. Thereafter, any court of competent jurisdiction, state or 
federal, could enforce the terms of the Fifth Amendment and order the 
commission to pay. The simple truism that the Fifth Amendment 
proscribes only takings without just compensation offers no insight at 
all as to the proper court in which compensation should be sought. Yet 
those words would be seized upon for decades, by federal courts 
throughout the country, as somehow justifying the dismissal of 
property owners’ federal constitutional claims seeking to establish that 
their property in fact was taken without just compensation.51 
The logical flaws and non sequiturs in Williamson County were so 
many and so glaring that the decision immediately became the target 
of sharp criticism from both scholars and practitioners.52 A steady 
 
 51. See, e.g., Downing/Salt Pond Partners, L.P. v. Rhode Island & Providence 
Plantations, 643 F.3d 16, 20 (1st Cir. 2011) (finding federal takings claim unripe 
because “the Fifth Amendment ‘does not proscribe the taking of property; it 
proscribes taking without just compensation.’”) (quoting Williamson County, 473 
U.S. at 194); Peters v. Village of Clifton, 498 F.3d 727, 730 (7th Cir. 2007) 
(dismissing landowner’s regulatory takings claim from federal court as unripe for 
failure to pursue state litigation because “no constitutional violation occurs until just 
compensation has been denied.” (quoting Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 195 
n.13)); Henry v. Jefferson Cnty. Planning Comm’n, 34 F. App’x 92, 95–96 (4th Cir. 
2002) (dismissing federal takings claim as unripe under Williamson County’s state 
procedural requirement because “the mere taking of a landowner’s property does not 
violate the Fifth Amendment; the violation occurs only when the property is taken 
and the landowner has been denied just compensation.”); Macene v. MJW, Inc., 951 
F.2d 700, 704 (6th Cir. 1991) (finding federal takings claim unripe because where 
“a state provides an adequate procedure for seeking just compensation, the property 
owner cannot claim a violation of the Just Compensation Clause until it has used the 
procedure and been denied just compensation.”) (quoting Williamson County, 473 
U.S. at 195)); Sinaloa Lake Owners Ass’n v. City of Simi Valley, 882 F.2d 1398, 
1402 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding physical takings claim unripe because “‘[t]he Fifth 
Amendment does not proscribe the taking of property; it proscribes taking without 
just compensation’”) (quoting Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 194), overruled on 
other grounds by Armendariz v. Penman, 75 F.3d 1311, 1326 (9th Cir. 1996); see 
also Kathryn E. Kovacs, Accepting the Relegation of Takings Claims to State 
Courts: The Federal Courts’ Misguided Attempts to Avoid Preclusion under 
Williamson County, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 10 n.49 (1999) (listing additional cases); 
Overstreet, supra note 26, at 117 n.160 (listing additional cases). 
 52. See Berger, supra note 24, at 39–40; see also Henry Paul Monaghan, State 
Law Wrongs, State Law Remedies, and the Fourteenth Amendment, 86 COLUM. L. 
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stream of critical commentary ensued over the next thirty years.53 This 
continuing interest in the case was fueled, at least in part, by the 
gradual revelation of unforeseen consequences of the decision—most 
of them detrimental to the ability of property owners to redress 
violations of their Fifth Amendment rights. 
B. Ripeness or Rot? Williamson County Evolved in Ways Both 
Unforeseen and Inevitable 
Because the ramifications of Williamson County had not adequately 
been thought through before the decision was handed down, the 
opinion evolved in practice in unforeseen ways. Although Justice 
Blackmun’s opinion seemed clear that failure to comply with the new 
ripeness requirements deprived district courts of Article III 
jurisdiction to hear a takings claim,54 subsequent cases began to refer 
to the doctrine as a “prudential” rule.55 After this development, federal 
 
REV. 979, 989–90 (1986). 
 53. See generally, e.g., R. S. Radford & Jennifer Fry Thompson, The Accidental 
Abstention Doctrine: After Thirty Years, the Case for Diverting Federal Takings 
Claims to State Court under Williamson County Has Yet to Be Made, 67 BAYLOR 
L. REV. 567, 567 (2015); Michael M. Berger, The Ripeness Game: Why Are We Still 
Forced to Play?, 30 TOURO L. REV. 297, 297 (2014); J. David Breemer, The Rebirth 
of Federal Takings Review? The Courts’ ‘Prudential’ Answer to Williamson 
County’s Flawed State Litigation Ripeness Requirement, 30 TOURO L. REV. 319, 
319 (2014); Hawley, supra note 29; J. David Breemer, You Can Check Out But You 
Can Never Leave: The Story of the San Remo Hotel—The Supreme Court Relegates 
Federal Takings Claims to State Courts Under a Rule Intended to Ripen the Claims 
for Federal Review, 33 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 247, 247 (2006); Scott A. Keller, 
Note, Judicial Jurisdiction Stripping Masquerading as Ripeness: Eliminating the 
Williamson County State Litigation Requirement for Regulatory Takings Claims, 85 
TEX. L. REV. 199, 199 (2006); Michael M. Berger & Gideon Kanner, Shell Game! 
You Can’t Get There from Here: Supreme Court Ripeness Jurisprudence in Takings 
Cases at Long Last Reaches the Self-Parody Stage, 36 URB. LAW. 671, 671 (2004); 
J. David Breemer, Overcoming Williamson County’s Troubling State Procedures 
Rule: How The England Reservation, Issue Preclusion Exceptions, and the 
Inadequacy Exception Open the Federal Courthouse Door to Ripe Takings Claims, 
18 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 209, 209 (2003); Peter A. Buchsbaum, Should Land 
Use Be Different? Reflection on Williamson County Regional Planning Board v. 
Hamilton Bank, in TAKING SIDES ON TAKINGS ISSUES 471 (Thomas E. Roberts ed., 
2002); Michael M. Berger, Supreme Bait & Switch: The Ripeness Ruse in 
Regulatory Takings, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 99, 99 (2000); Gregory Overstreet, 
Update on the Continuing and Dramatic Effect of the Ripeness Doctrine on Federal 
Land Use Litigation, 20 ZONING & PLAN. L. REP. 25, 25 (1997). 
 54. See, e.g., Austin v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 840 F.2d 678, 682 (9th Cir. 
1988) (“Williamson County affects our jurisdiction to hear takings claims. . . ‘A 
court lacks discretion to consider the merits of a case over which it is without 
jurisdiction.’”) (emphasis added; citation omitted). 
 55. See, e.g., Suitum v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 733–34 
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judges were free to decide whether to adjudicate regulatory takings 
claims on a case-by-case basis. Although most federal judges 
continued to decline to do so, a new element of uncertainty was created 
by the possibility that, in any random case, Williamson County’s state 
litigation requirement might be waived.56  
Even more troubling – at least to aggrieved property owners – was 
the Court’s decision in City of Chicago v. International College of 
Surgeons.57 That 1997 opinion, which did not so much as mention 
Williamson County, upheld the jurisdiction of a federal court to 
adjudicate a regulatory takings claim that washad been removed from 
state court by the municipal defendant.58 City of Chicago thereby 
created a unique procedural asymmetry: property owners seeking to 
file takings claims against local jurisdictions were barred from federal 
court under Williamson County, but City of Chicago guaranteed 
unimpeded access to federal court for governmental defendants in 
those same cases who asserted removal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1441(a). 
But by far the most damning indictment of Williamson County’s 
slipshod underpinnings was the fact that neither the Court nor any 
party before it considered the relationship between the new state 
procedures doctrine and ordinary principles of claim and issue 
preclusion.59 The opinion repeatedly emphasized that the plaintiff’s 
takings claim was not barred outright from federal court. Because the 
claim was “not yet ripe,”60 it was merely “premature” to file in that 
forum before utilizing the state courts.61 As one Supreme Court 
litigator put it, “There simply is no rational way for an English 
 
(1997) (explaining Williamson County established “two independent prudential 
hurdles to a regulatory takings claim brought against a state entity in federal court.”) 
(emphasis added). 
 56. See, e.g., Yamagiwa v. City of Half Moon Bay, 523 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1108–
10 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (holding that Williamson County was waived when a municipal 
defendant removed a takings claim from state to federal court, and then sought to 
have the case dismissed as unripe). 
 57. 522 U.S. 156, 156 (1997). 
 58. Id. at 160–61, 174. 
 59. Claim preclusion (res judicata) bars the subsequent litigation of claims that 
were, or could have been, brought in a previous judicial proceeding between the 
same parties. Issue preclusion (collateral estoppel) bars the subsequent litigation of 
issues of fact or law that were resolved in a previous judicial proceeding between 
the parties. regardless of the claims in which they arose. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF JUDGMENTS §§ 17, 27 (AM. LAW INST. 1982).  
 60. Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 
473 U.S. 172, 197 (1985). 
 61. Id. at 194. 
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speaking person to read Williamson County other than holding that 
property owners can satisfy those newly minted ripeness requirements 
and thereby render their claim ripe for federal court litigation.”62 The 
possibility that once a plaintiff unsuccessfully sought compensation in 
state court the taking claim would be barred from subsequent federal 
litigation is not hinted at in Williamson County, and was apparently 
never raised when the case was before the Court.63 
However, it quickly became clear that the state procedures 
requirement was incompatible with long-standing preclusion doctrine. 
Once a Fifth Amendment takings claim has been litigated in state court 
in compliance with Williamson County, the Full Faith and Credit Act 
requires federal courts to apply that state’s preclusion doctrines to any 
further litigation between the parties involving the same claim or 
issues.64 In most cases, this would prevent a federal court from hearing 
a takings claim at all.65 The fundamental premise underlying 
Williamson County’s state procedures rule—that submitting a federal 
takings claim to state court would “ripen” it for subsequent litigation 
in federal court—turned out to be a procedural impossibility. Far from 
ripening such a claim, complying with Williamson County would 
effectively extinguish it.66 
 
 62. Berger, Supreme Bait & Switch, supra note 53, at 105; see also Stewart E. 
Sterk & Michael C. Pollack, A Knock on Knick’s Revival of Federal Takings 
Litigation, 72 FLA. L. REV. 419 (2020) (“The Williamson County opinion appeared 
to contemplate that a landowner could ripen a federal court takings claim by seeking 
all relief available under state law.”) To regulatory advocates, the distinction 
between ripening a claim and being permanently barred from federal court may seem 
no more than a “quibble over terminology.” See John Echeverria, Knick v. Township 
of Scott: Takings Advocates’ Nonsensical Forum Shopping Agenda, CPR BLOG, 
(Sept. 28, 2018), https://www.progressivereform.org/cpr-blog/knick-v-township-of-
scott-takings-advocates-nonsensical-forum-shopping-agenda/ 
[https://perma.cc/C3HD-2R8V]. But to property owners attempting to enforce their 
rights under the Fifth Amendment, divining the actual meaning of Williamson 
County was a matter of some urgency. 
 63. See Br. for Resp’t Hamilton Bank, supra note 35, at *68–9; Br. for United 
States, supra note 30; Tr. of Oral Arg., supra note 50; Library of Congress: Harry A 
Blackmun Papers, Box No. 425, case folder 84-4 (containing Justice Blackmun’s 
notes of issues raised before, during, and after oral argument of Williamson County).  
 64. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2012). 
 65. See, e.g., Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 80–85 
(1984) (reviewing competing policy objectives of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Full 
Faith and Credit Act, concluding that allowing litigants to bring their state claims in 
state court and return to federal court to litigate their federal claims “may seem 
attractive from a plaintiff’s perspective, [but] it is not the system established by 
‘1738.’”). 
 66. See, e.g., Berger, Supreme Bait & Switch, supra note 53, at 102 (“[T]he very 
act of ripening a case also ends it.”). 
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Twenty years after Williamson County was handed down, the High 
Court finally acknowledged what no one had thought of in 1985: that 
the practical effect of the state procedures requirement was to 
permanently deny access to federal court for most plaintiffs with Fifth 
Amendment takings claims against local governments. In San Remo 
Hotel v. City and County of San Francisco, the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to finally confront the question of whether issue preclusion 
permanently bars a takings claim from federal court, solely because 
the plaintiff complied with Williamson County’s state procedures 
requirement.67 
In language hinting that the plaintiffs were engaged in some kind of 
procedural trickery, Justice Stevens’s unanimous opinion framed the 
issue as one of “giving losing litigants access to an additional appellate 
tribunal,”68 and proclaimed that the Ninth Circuit was correct to 
decline petitioner’s invitation to ignore the requirements of [the Full 
Faith and Credit Act].”69 Absent from the opinion was any explanation 
of why Fifth Amendment takings plaintiffs should be required to 
litigate their claims in state court in the first place. Although the Court 
in San Remo Hotel unanimously agreed that the usual effect of the 
state procedures rule would be to permanently bar federal 
constitutional claims from federal court, no attempt was made to 
ground this outcome in traditional principles of ripeness—or any other 
doctrine. 
San Remo Hotel brought the most disconcerting aspect of 
Williamson County into sharp focus: over the entire thirty-four years 
of its existence, neither the Supreme Court nor any lower court 
applying the state procedures requirement was able to advance any 
intelligible rationale for the rule.70 Moreover, a four-justice 
concurrence, penned by Chief Justice Rehnquist, objected that “the 
justifications for [the] state litigation requirement are suspect, while 
 
 67. San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, 326 (2005). 
 68. Id. at 345. 
 69. Id. at 347–48. 
 70. Some regulatory advocates have attempted to find a post-hoc grounding for 
the state procedures rule in principles of federalism. See, e.g., Note, Fifth 
Amendment-Takings Clause-State Litigation Requirement-Knick v. Township of 
Scott, 133 Harv. L. Rev. 322, 330 (2019); Stewart E. Sterk, The Demise of Federal 
Takings Litigation, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 251, 299–300 (2006). However, not 
only did Williamson County itself make no mention of federalism, such a rationale 
would negate “the whole point of Section 1983.” Michael M. Berger, What’s 
Federalism Got to Do with Regulatory Takings?, 8 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS. 
CONF. J. 9, 30 (2019); see also Radford & Thompson, supra note 53, at 613-17 
(discussing the inapplicability of federalism-based rationales to Williamson County). 
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its impact on takings plaintiffs is dramatic” and called for the rule to 
be reconsidered “[i]n an appropriate case.”71 Yet inexplicably, another 
fourteen years passed and three of the four San Remo Hotel justices 
who called for reconsideration left the bench before the Court decided 
that Knick was the “appropriate case.” 
C. Knick Finally Drives a Stake Through Williamson County 
It is remarkable that Williamson County’s state litigation 
requirement remained good law for thirty-four years in light of its lack 
of doctrinal basis, devasting effect on property owners, and lack of 
coherent defense from its supporters. Over most of that time, petitions 
were regularly filed asking the Court to reconsider the rule and just as 
regularly were denied.72 The Court finally determined to remedy its 
error in Knick v. Township of Scott—a case from the Third Circuit 
Court of Appeals that seemed rather mundane compared to many that 
had fallen afoul of Williamson County in the past.73   
The dispute in Knick stemmed from an ordinance the Township of 
Scott, Pennsylvania, enacted, requiring all cemeteries to be open and 
accessible to the public.74 Rose Mary Knick was notified that she 
violated the measure because grave markers were found on her ninety-
acre farm, which was decidedly not open to the public.75 After 
unsuccessfully seeking an injunction, Mrs. Knick sued the township 
in federal court on the grounds that the public access requirement 
amounted to a taking of her property in violation of the Fifth 
Amendment.76 The district court dismissed the complaint as unripe 
under Williamson County, and the Third Circuit, while acknowledging 
that the ordinance was “extraordinary and constitutionally suspect,” 
affirmed.77 The Supreme Court granted certiorari “to reconsider the 
holding of Williamson County that property owners must seek just 
 
 71. San Remo Hotel, 545 U.S. at 352 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the 
judgment). 
 72. See, e.g., Wayside Church v. Van Buren Cty., 847 F.3d 812, 812 (6th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 380 (2017); Arrigoni Enters., LLC v. Town of Durham, 18 
F. Supp. 3d 188 (D. Conn. 2014), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1409 (2016); Alto Eldorado 
P’ship v. Cty. of Santa Fe, 634 F.3d 1170 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 880 
(2011). 
 73. Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2162 (2019). 
 74. Id. at 2168.. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 2168–69. 
 77. Id. at 2169. 
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compensation under state law in state court before bringing a federal 
takings claim.”78 
Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion announced what should 
have been a self-evident rule: “[A] property owner has a claim for a 
violation of the Takings Clause as soon as a government takes his 
property for public use without paying for it.”79 In overruling the 1985 
decision, the Chief Justice noted, “Williamson County was not just 
wrong. Its reasoning was exceptionally ill founded and conflicted with 
much of our takings jurisprudence.”80  
The Knick Court brushed aside the central fallacy of Williamson 
County—the conflation of a state’s judicial system with local 
government agencies as a singular conceptual “state” entity. The right 
to compensation under the Fifth Amendment arises at the time an 
agency takes private property for public use, regardless of available 
post-taking remedies and regardless of what a state court might or 
might not have to say about it.81 The opinion gave similarly short shrift 
to Williamson County’s inapt analogy to Monsanto and suits in the 
Court of Federal Claims, noting bluntly: “The [Williamson County] 
Court was simply confused.”82 Highlighting the double standard 
implicit in Williamson County, the Chief Justice noted that the effect 
of Knick would be to “restor[e] takings claims to the full-fledged 
constitutional status the Framers envisioned when they included the 
[Takings] Clause among the other protections in the Bill of Rights.”83   
Practitioners and commentators who dealt with the confusion, 
contradictions, and outright injustices of Williamson County for over 
three decades found the reasoning of Knick obvious and 
straightforward.84 Nevertheless, Justice Kagan’s dissent saw the 
Williamson County doctrine as unproblematic, even with the 
retrospective understanding that it permanently bars plaintiffs with 
 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 2170. 
 80. Id. at 2178. 
 81. Id. at 2170–71. 
 82. Id. at 2174. 
 83. Id. at 2170. 
 84. See, e.g., R. S. Radford, Best Takings Decision We Should Never Have 
Needed, S.F. DAILY J., July 3, 2019, at 7 (“The holding in Knick “seems so obvious 
that it should never have needed to be said.”); Michael M. Berger, Ding Dong, the 
Witch Is Dead!, S.F. DAILY J., June 24, 2019, at 7 (“[T]he clear logic of the majority 
opinion gives one pause to question why it took . . . [34 years] to see the errors at 
the heart of Williamson County and to acknowledge the unfairness being inflicted 
on one specific class of constitutional plaintiffs.”). 
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constitutional claims from seeking a remedy in federal court.85 The 
dissent leaned heavily on a nineteenth century case, Cherokee Nation 
v. Southern Kansas Railway Co.86 Cherokee Nation addressed the 
constitutionality of an Act of Congress authorizing a railroad across 
part of the Indian Territory and establishing an elaborate, multi-tiered 
system to appraise the value of the easement taken to provide 
compensation to the tribe. It was in that context that Justice Harlan’s 
opinion observed: 
 
[The Takings Clause] does not provide or require that 
compensation shall be actually paid in advance of the 
occupancy of the land to be taken. But the owner is 
entitled to reasonable, certain and adequate provision 
for obtaining compensation before his occupancy is 
disturbed. Whether a particular provision be sufficient 
to secure the compensation to which, under the 
Constitution, he is entitled, is sometimes a question of 
difficulty. In the present case, the requirements of the 
Constitution have, in our judgment, been fully met.87 
 
These remarks addressed an exercise of direct condemnation, in which 
compensation to the landowners was expressly acknowledged and 
provided for in the Act itself. To apply the same language to inverse 
condemnation, as the Knick dissent does—interpreting it to mean no 
liability for the taking is incurred until a state court passes on the 
question of whether any compensation will be paid at all—entails a 
conceptual leap that could not have been contemplated by the 
Cherokee Nation Court.88 
Irrespective of Justice Kagan’s misplaced appeal to precedent, the 
Knick dissent maintained that an alleged violation of the Fifth 
 
 85. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2180 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 86. See id. at 2182; Cherokee Nation v. S. Kan. Ry. Co., 135 U.S. 641, 659 
(1890). 
 87. S. Kan. Ry. Co., 135 U.S. at 659. 
 88. Knick, 139 S. Ct at 2182–83 (Kagan, J., dissenting); see also Ilya Somin, 
Knick v. Township of Scott: Ending a Catch-22 that Barred Takings Cases from 
Federal Court, CATO SUP. CT. REV., 2018-2019, at 153, 178 (“There can be no such 
advance assurance of ‘reasonable, certain and adequate’ compensation in a case 
where the government denies that any compensation is due in the first place.”); 
Wake, supra note 48, at 229 (Cherokee Nation “would seem to speak only to cases 
in which the government has acknowledged that it is using the power of eminent 
domain and has made allowance for the payment of fair market value of the 
condemned land, as was contemplated with the enactment then in question.”). 
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Amendment, brought under section 1983, “more properly belongs” in 
state court because state judges are more familiar with state law.89 This 
argument had already been raised by Justice Stevens in San Remo 
Hotel, where it was skewered by Chief Justice Rehnquist:  
 
[T]he Court has not explained why we should hand 
authority over federal takings claims to state courts, 
based simply on their relative familiarity with local 
land-use decisions and proceedings, while allowing 
plaintiffs to proceed directly to federal court in cases 
involving, for example, challenges to municipal 
land-use regulations based on the First Amendment, or 
the Equal Protection Clause.90 
 
On a more general level, Justice Kagan’s position was rebutted 55 
years earlier, in Justice William O. Douglas’s concurring opinion in 
England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners: 
 
[T]he complexity of local law to federal judges is 
inherent in the federal court system as designed by 
Congress. Resolution of local law questions is implicit 
in diversity of citizenship jurisdiction. Since Erie R. 
Co. v. Tompkins, the federal courts under that head of 
jurisdiction daily have the task of determining what the 
state law is. The fact that those questions are complex 
and difficult is no excuse for a refusal by the District 
Court to entertain the suit.91  
 
But whatever one makes of the view that state judges should 
adjudicate federal constitutional claims because of their familiarity 
with the subject matter, it is no longer the law after Knick. 
 
 
 89. Knick, 139 S. Ct at 2187; see also Note, Fifth Amendment-Takings Clause-
State Litigation Requirement-Knick v. Township of Scott, supra note 70, at 330 
(suggesting that federal judges, as opposed to their state-court counterparts, might 
be unable to determine the content of a state’s common law of property, thereby 
inadvertently destroying property rights while attempting to protect them). 
 90. San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, 350–51 (Rehnquist, 
C.J., concurring in the judgment) (internal citations omitted). 
 91. England v. La. State Board of Med. Exam’rs, 375 U.S. 411, 426 (1964) 
(Douglas, J., concurring). 
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III. THE ELEPHANT IN THE COURTROOM—WILL FEDERAL COURTS 
RISE TO THE CHALLENGE? 
A. Both Supporters and Critics of  Knick Assume the Decision Will 
Lead to More Successful Takings Lawsuits 
Although virtually no analysts defended the doctrinal basis of the 
state litigation requirement during the thirty-four years of Williamson 
County’s existence, many insisted that the rule did no harm because 
state judges would uphold the constitutional rights of property owners 
as vigorously as their federal counterparts.92 This “presumed parity of 
state and federal courts for the litigation of federal rights”93 underlays 
Justice Stevens’s dismissive remark in San Remo Hotel in which he 
states, “it is entirely unclear why [petitioners’] preference for a federal 
forum should matter for constitutional or statutory purposes.”94 
This narrative evaporated the moment Knick raised the prospect that 
property owners might once again be allowed to pursue Fifth 
Amendment takings claims in their choice of forum. Instead of 
continuing to assert the equivalence of state and federal courts, 
regulatory advocates portrayed Knick as ushering in extensive new 
financial liability for local agencies whose restrictive land-use 
regulations (which would be upheld in state court) could not survive 
constitutional scrutiny by federal judges. Senator Sheldon Whitehouse 
railed in The National Law Journal that the Knick Court was acting as 
“delivery boys for big Republican donor interests.”95 The decision was 
cast as a “big prize” for “big-money developers and regulated 
industries.”96 These nefarious characters supposedly spent hundreds 
of millions of dollars in “dark money” to achieve this “massive victory 
for the partisan donor interests seeking to control our courts.”97 
Similarly, Jonathan Zasloff, posting on the Legal Planet blog, labeled 
Knick the “Roy Cohn case.”98 For those too young to recognize the 
 
 92. See, e.g., Kovacs, supra note 51, at 47 (“If state courts can be trusted to 
protect the interests of criminal defendants, surely they can be trusted to fairly 
resolve the claims of property owners.”). 
 93. Jamison E. Colburn, Splitting the Atom of Property: Rights Experimentalism 
as Obligation to Future Generations, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1411, 1436 (2009). 
 94. San Remo Hotel, 545 U.S. at 344. 
 95. Sheldon Whitehouse, Why the ‘Knick’ Ruling Signals a New Day, NAT’L L. 
J. (July 24, 2019, 2:53 PM), 
https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/2019/07/24/why-the-knick-ruling-
signals-a-new-day/ [https://perma.cc/24WR-8AND]. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Jonathan Zasloff, Roy Cohn Meets the Takings Clause, LEGAL PLANET (Mar. 
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reference, Zasloff explained, “Roy Cohn was one of the most 
disgusting figures of 20th century American law.”99 The reason for 
these virulent reactions was straightforward: reopening the federal 
courthouse doors to takings claims meant, according to Zasloff, that 
“we will start seeing more private property owners winning these 
cases.”100  
Zasloff offered no explanation for why the number of successful 
takings claims would increase when property owners were once again 
allowed access to federal courts. Whitehouse broadly implied that 
federal judges would be more likely to uphold property owners’ 
constitutional rights because the federal judiciary, or a growing 
portion of it, is corrupt—”handpicked to favor corporations.”101 Never 
mind that almost none of the takings plaintiffs who have prevailed at 
the Supreme Court have been corporations, while several corporations 
and other large business interests have lost.102  
In addition to his “corporate influence” narrative, Senator 
Whitehouse advanced a more substantive account of why state court 
judges would be less likely to uphold property owners’ rights than 
their federal counterparts. He maintained that state courts offer a more 
difficult forum in which to litigate takings claims because state judges 
allegedly care more “about things such as affordable housing and 
environmental protection—stuff Americans want their government to 
 
4, 2019), https://legal-planet.org/2019/03/04/roy-cohn-meets-the-takings-clause/ 
[https://perma.cc/F8Z8-MLAM]. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Sheldon Whitehouse, Why the ‘Knick’ Ruling Signals a New Day, NAT’L L. 
J. (July 24, 2019, 2:53 PM), 
https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/2019/07/24/why-the-knick-ruling-
signals-a-new-day/ [https://perma.cc/24WR-8AND]. 
 102. Compare, Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162 (prevailing plaintiff was 
a farm owner), Horne v. Dep’t of Agriculture, 576 U.S. 350 (2015) (prevailing 
plaintiff was a raisin grower), Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 
U.S. 595 (2013) (prevailing plaintiff was an individual property owner), Palazzolo 
v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001) (prevailing plaintiff was an individual property 
owner), Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725 (1997) 
(prevailing plaintiff was a widowed homeowner), Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal 
Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (prevailing plaintiff was an individual property 
owner), Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) (prevailing plaintiff was a 
small business owner), and First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale 
v. Cty. of L.A., 482 U.S. 304 (prevailing plaintiff was a local church), with Lingle 
v. Chevron USA Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005) (losing plaintiff was a petroleum refining 
and distribution corporation), Keystone Bituminous Coal Assoc. v. DeBenedictis, 
480 U.S. 470 (losing plaintiff was an association of coal producers), and Penn 
Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (losing plaintiff was 
a major transportation holding company).   
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do with its eminent domain power.”103 Of course, regulatory takings 
claims, such as the one in Knick, have nothing to do with the exercise 
of eminent domain except insofar as the government has chosen not to 
exercise it. If the Township of Scott wanted to condemn an easement 
across Mrs. Knick’s land for the benefit of the public who wished to 
view the gravesites on her property, the Township had (and still has) 
the authority to do so under its power of eminent domain, paying Mrs. 
Knick the fair market value of the easement in accordance with 
standard principles of condemnation law.104 Regulatory takings, 
however, involve inverse condemnation—whereby the government 
imposes a use on private property for the public benefit but declines 
to pay for it.105 The purposes for which the government wants to take 
the property, so long as they satisfy the “public use” requirement, are 
immaterial to the constitutional analysis. Stripped of the inapt 
reference to eminent domain, Senator Whitehouse seemed suggest that 
state judges are more likely than their federal counterparts to uphold 
uncompensated takings of property, in contravention of the Fifth 
Amendment, simply because they approve of the purpose for which 
the property is taken. 
Senator Whitehouse offered no documentation to support his theory 
of why takings plaintiffs are more likely to lose in state court, but he 
agrees on this point with many property-rights advocates who expect 
more rulings in favor of takings claimants now that Knick reopened 
the federal courthouse doors. For example, Richard Epstein, author of 
the landmark 1985 book, Takings,106 is confident that “[t]his new 
jurisdictional option will result in some large judgments against local 
governments, and it doubtless will introduce a welcome note of 
 
 103. Sheldon Whitehouse, Why the ‘Knick’ Ruling Signals a New Day, NAT’L L. 
J. (July 24, 2019, 2:53 PM), 
https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/2019/07/24/why-the-knick-ruling-
signals-a-new-day/ [https://perma.cc/24WR-8AND]. For a more nuanced 
hypothesis, see David A. Dana, Not Just a Procedural Case: The Substantive 
Implications of Knick for State Property Law and Federal Takings Doctrine (Nw. 
Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 19-11; Nw. Pub. Law Research Paper No. 19-26) 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3508857 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3508857 
(Knick may “move the courts toward a more property-rights-protective, pro-
compensation version of substantive federal Takings doctrine,” one which could 
“deprive state and local regulators of flexibility that they require for effective 
adaptation to climate change.”).  
 104. See, e.g., EMINENT DOMAIN: A HANDBOOK OF CONDEMNATION LAW 17 
(William Scheiderich et al. eds., 2011). 
 105. See, e.g., STEVEN J. EAGLE, REGULATORY TAKINGS 1-6 (5th ed., 2012).  
 106. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF 
EMINENT DOMAIN (1985). 
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caution in local governments by exposing them to more powerful legal 
relief.”107  
These expectations have an obvious plausibility based on 
widespread skepticism concerning the objectivity of state courts in 
adjudicating constitutional claims against local governmental entities. 
In a classic 1977 article in the Harvard Law Review, Burt Neuborne 
argued that federal courts are generally more inclined toward federal 
constitutional litigants for institutional reasons, including their 
insulation from local political pressures.108 Years before Williamson 
County, William Ryckman observed that property owners were 
turning to the federal judiciary more frequently to escape “local bias 
against federal [constitutional] claims,”109 believing that the likelihood 
of successfully asserting their Fifth Amendment rights would be 
undermined by “political and psychological pressures affecting state 
courts.”110 By its nature, a regulatory takings claim typically entails a 
landowner seeking to impose financial liability upon a local 
government. Viewed in that light: 
 
[A]n almost certain prejudice is created by having an 
elected or appointed state judge, sitting in the same 
local area as the alleged taking, decide the case. In 
contrast, federal judges who enjoy life-tenure are far 
more likely to be removed from local biases.111 
 
In those states (the large majority)112 where judges must stand for 
election, “[p]otential bias by state courts is more than just a theoretical 
problem given the reality that many state judges . . . have close ties to 
state parties and political leaders who adopt policies that result in 
regulatory takings.”113 Under the Williamson County regime, many 
 
 107. Richard Epstein, A Quiet Revolution in Property Rights, RICOCHET.COM 
(July 2, 2019), https://ricochet.com/636016/a-quiet-revolution-in-property-rights/ 
[https://perma.cc/2GPV-HVRA]. 
 108. Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1120–21 (1977). 
 109. Ryckman, supra note 30, at 378. 
 110. Id. at 379. 
 111. Overstreet, supra note 26, at 92–93. 
 112. See State-by-State Summary of Judicial Selection, USLEGAL.COM, 
https://courts.uslegal.com/selection-of-judges/state-by-state-summary-of-judicial-
selection/ [https://perma.cc/ZY45-W6SX].  
 113. Somin, supra note 88, at 182; see also Brian T. Hodges, Knick v. Township 
of Scott, Pa: How a Graveyard Dispute Resurrected the Fifth Amendment’s Takings 
Clause, 60 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 25 (2020) (“Federal judges are typical[ly] 
viewed as being more removed from local politics than their state counterparts (a 
vast majority of whom are elected). The need to distance oneself from local politics 
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landowners considered the prospect of receiving a fair hearing in state 
court so poor that they “declined to pursue their rights or ended up 
throwing in the towel.”114 As Professor Epstein observed in the 
context of rent regulations in New York, the demise of the state 
litigation requirement means that “virtually all the constitutional 
challenges to New York State’s new rent laws will be brought in 
federal court to escape the strong pro-tenant bias that dominates New 
York state courts.”115 
However, while all of these considerations support an expectation 
that takings litigants will attempt to flee the perceived pro-government 
bias of state courts—arguably generating the “flood” of new federal 
litigation Justice Kagan bemoaned in her Knick dissent116—they do 
not bear directly on the question that aggrieved property owners are 
most interested in: are those claims likely to fare any better before the 
federal judiciary? The historical record in that regard is bleak. 
B. The Sorry History of Federal-Court Enforcement of the Takings 
Clause Offers Little Support for That View 
1. For Decades, Federal Judges Have Freely Expressed Their 
Distaste for Adjudicating the Constitutionality of Land Use 
Restrictions. 
Any supposition that federal judges have been waiting eagerly for 
an opportunity to vindicate the rights of property owners and impose 
takings liability on local governments is wildly at variance with the 
existing record. As one commentator observed, “the federal bench’s 
reluctance to decide takings cases and treatment of property rights as 
secondary to other constitutional rights indicate that the usual 
 
is often pronounced in the context of takings law”) (citation omitted); Alicia 
Gonzalez & Susan L. Trevarthen, Deciding Where to Take Your Takings Case Post-
Knick, 49 STETSON L. REV. 539, 566 (2020) (“With land use decisions … if you are 
the party whose position is not generally favored in the community, having the case 
heard in federal court might be preferable.”). 
 114. Robert H. Thomas, Knick Analysis, Part I: After More Than 30 Years, 
Supreme Court Reopens The Federal Courthouse Door To Property Owners, 




 115. Richard Epstein, A Quiet Revolution in Property Rights, RICOCHET.COM 
(July 2, 2019), https://ricochet.com/636016/a-quiet-revolution-in-property-rights/ 
[https://perma.cc/2GPV-HVRA]. 
 116. Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S.Ct. 2162, 2189 (2019) (Kagain, J., dissenting). 
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assumptions regarding federal courts’ sympathies in constitutional 
cases may not apply in takings cases.”117 While it was presumably 
intended tongue-in-cheek, Chief Justice Roberts’s comment to 
Mrs.Rose Mary Knick’s counsel concerning the consequences of 
overruling Williamson County was solidly grounded in reality: 
 
[Y]ou can answer the letters that we’re going to get 
from district court judges around the country who are 
not going to be very happy learning that they now have 
to adjudicate state inverse condemnation actions, 
which can be fairly elaborate.118 
 
Twenty-five years ago, the late Chief Justice Rehnquist declared that 
“[w]e see no reason why the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 
as much a part of the Bill of Rights as the First Amendment or Fourth 
Amendment, should be relegated to the status of a poor relation.”119 
Yet that sentiment has not been reflected in any observable change in 
the long-standing attitudes of many federal judges, that land use 
disputes are “not terribly important and somewhat beneath them.”120  
Dating back to 1955, inverse condemnation claims against local 
governments were routinely litigated in federal courts,121 but as the 
number of such actions skyrocketed in response to increasingly 
restrictive land use regulations, the keenness of federal judges to 
resolve cases decreased proportionately. By the time Knick reached 
the Supreme Court, the National Governors’ Association observed 
that it had been “long recognized that land use disputes present 
fundamentally local fights that federal courts should not referee” and 
complained that overruling Williamson County “would demand that 
federal courts intervene in these common, distinctly local 
controversies.”122 The tone of this passage—that applying the text of 
 
 117. Kovacs, supra note 51, at 46 (1999); see also Laura D. Beaton & Matthew 
D. Zinn, Knick v. Township of Scott: A Source of New Uncertainty for State and 
Local Governments in Regulatory Takings Challenges to Land Use Regulation, 47 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 623, 625 (2020) (“[H]istorically, lower federal courts have been 
deeply reluctant to referee land use disputes and may lack enthusiasm for a new 
category of claims in that field.”). 
 118. Transcript of Oral Argument at 23, Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S.Ct. 2162 
(2019) (No. 17-647). 
 119. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 392 (1994). 
 120. Overstreet, supra note 26, at 103 (citation omitted). 
 121. See Sixth Camden Corp. v. Twp. of Evesham, 420 F. Supp. 709, 721 (D. 
N.J., 1976) (citing cases). 
 122. Brief for National Governors Association et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
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the Constitution to protect landowners’ rights would comprise a 
somewhat distasteful burden on federal judges—mirrors the language 
of many decisions over the past forty years. 
Federal judges have expressed a special disdain for reviewing the 
application of zoning regulations for compliance with the 
Constitution, often sounding as though they consider the task 
unbecoming the dignity of their office. Two years before Williamson 
County, the Seventh Circuit objected that the “availability of federal 
review of every zoning decision would only serve to further congest 
an already overburdened federal court system.”123 Another panel of 
the same circuit acknowledged that it was “conceivable that a federal 
lawsuit might arise out of a zoning dispute” but nevertheless grumbled 
that “[t]he idea that constitutional rights are implicated in this quarrel 
over the zoning rules is not one to which we would like to become 
accustomed.”124  
By the 1980s, the federal judiciary developed a virtual mantra, 
repeated as often as necessary, to the effect that “federal courts do not 
sit as zoning boards of review.”125 As the Ninth Circuit memorably 
noted, it was necessary to “guard against the federal courts becoming 
the Grand Mufti of local zoning boards.”126 Never was this theme 
hammered home more brutally than by Judge Easterbrook in River 
Park, Inc. v. City of Highland Park:127  
 
Federal Courts are not boards of zoning appeals. This 
message, oft repeated, has not penetrated the 
consciousness of property owners who believe that 
federal judges are more hospitable to their claims than 
state judges. Why they should believe this we haven’t 





Respondents at 30–31, Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019) (No. 17-647). 
 123. Scudder v. Town of Greendale, 704 F.2d 999, 1003 (7th Cir. 1983). 
 124. Albery v. Reddig, 718 F.2d 245, 251 (7th Cir. 1983). 
 125. Spence v. Zimmerman, 873 F. 2d 256, 262 (11th Cir. 1989); see also 
Raskiewicz v. Town of New Boston, 754 F.2d 38, 44 (1st Cir.1985) (“federal courts 
do not sit as a super zoning board or zoning board of appeals”).  
 126. Hoehne v. Cty of San Benito, 870 F.2d 529, 532 (9th Cir. 1989). 
 127. See generally, 23 F.3d 164, 164 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 128. Id. at 165 (emphasis added). 
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2. Abstention Offered an Inviting Way for Federal Courts to Avoid 
Adjudicating Takings Cases 
One reason no land-use takings claims have prevailed in Judge 
Easterbrook’s Seventh Circuit (and very few in any other circuit) is 
that federal judges became adept, even before Williamson County, at 
diverting these cases to state court. As Michael Berger pointed out, 
when Williamson County was handed down, it did not represent the 
beginning of a doctrine of shunting takings cases to state court; rather, 
it was the culmination of that doctrine.129 
Before 1985, the preferred method employed by federal courts to 
avoid adjudicating takings claims in land use cases was abstention.130 
In the Ninth Circuit, federal courts began invoking Pullman abstention 
to avoid adjudicating these cases even before it was possible to bring 
them under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.131 There are two requirements for 
abstaining under the Pullman doctrine in the Ninth Circuit.132 First, 
the complaint must touch on “a sensitive area of social policy upon 
which the federal courts ought not to enter unless no alternative to its 
adjudication is open” (in Pullman, the racial composition of sleeping-
car crews).133 Second, the case must involve an unsettled or “doubtful” 
question of state law, the resolution of which may terminate the 
controversy without reaching the federal constitutional issue (in 
Pullman, the meaning of Article 6445 of the Texas Civil Statutes, 
 
 129. See Berger, supra note 84. 
 130. See Berger, Supreme Bait & Switch, supra note 53, at 100–01 (“In the old 
days, judges issued abstention orders when property owners had the temerity to seek 
federal court application of the federal constitution. Those orders required the 
owners to repair to state court to see whether resolution of state law issues might 
moot or, at least, confine the federal issues. This shunted many regulatory taking 
cases into state courts.”) (Footnotes omitted). The history of pre-Williamson County 
abstention in regulatory takings cases presented in this section is related in more 
detail in Radford & Thompson, supra note 53, at 597–608. 
 131. See, e.g., Rancho Palos Verdes Corp. v. City of Laguna Beach, 547 F.2d 
1092, 1094 (9th Cir. 1976). Although states and state agencies are not “persons” 
subject to suit under Section 1983, municipalities and other local governmental 
entities such as school districts were brought within the scope of the section by 
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
 132. The Pullman doctrine stems from R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 
U.S. 496 (1941), a case that challenged a Texas Railroad Commission regulation 
requiring that sleeping cars on Texas trains be operated by (white) conductors, rather 
than by (African-American) porters. The Supreme Court ordered a federal district 
court to abstain from issuing an injunction pending a determination in state court of 
the scope and meaning of the Texas statute under which the regulation was issued. 
The requirements for applying the doctrine in the Ninth Circuit were set forth in 
Canton v. Spokane Sch. Dist. No. 81, 498 F.2d 840, 845 (9th Cir. 1974). 
 133. Pullman, 312 U.S. at 498. 
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under which the Commission claimed authority to issue the 
regulation).134 That neither of the required elements would be 
implicated in a typical regulatory takings claim did not deter federal 
judges from routinely invoking the doctrine when such cases came 
before them. 
As early as 1976, courts in the Ninth Circuit determined that any 
litigation involving local land use regulations, by definition, touched 
upon a “sensitive area of social policy,” and began ordering abstention 
on that basis alone.135 The other Pullman requirement an unsettled 
question of state law that might resolve the controversy, effectively 
fell out of the equation. A 1982 California study found that none of 
the federal judges who ordered Pullman abstention in land use cases 
“specified the unclear question of state law that supported 
abstention.”136 Yet appellate judges in the circuit were so eager to 
avoid grappling with these claims that invocations of Pullman 
abstention were upheld even when the trial court identified no state 
law question whatsoever that could be resolved so as to moot the 
federal constitutional issue.137 On more than one occasion, Ninth 
Circuit panels suggested that the existence of a possibly determinative 
state-law claim was sufficient to justify Pullman abstention in takings 
cases even if the claim was not raised and therefore not at issue in the 
litigation.138 These rulings lend credence to speculation by the author 
 
 134. Id. at 498–500. 
 135. Rancho Palos Verdes Corp., 547 F.2d at 1094. 
 136. Theodore Eisenberg, Section 1983: Doctrinal Foundations and an Empirical 
Study, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 482, 541–42 (1982); see also Note, Land Use 
Regulation, the Federal Courts, and the Abstention Doctrine, 89 YALE L.J. 1134, 
1149 (1980) (suggesting that only a minority of land use cases in federal courts 
involve unclear state issues that affect constitutional claims); Brian W. Blaesser, 
Closing the Federal Courthouse Door on Property Owners: The Ripeness and 
Abstention Doctrines in Section 1983 Land Use Cases, 2 HOFSTRA PROP. L.J. 73, 86 
(1988) (“In the majority of the decisions that apply Pullman abstention, the courts 
have not addressed the extent to which the state law question is unsettled.”). 
 137. See Newport Invs., Inc. v. City of Laguna Beach, 564 F.2d 893, 895 (9th Cir. 
1977) (“The district judge obviously believed, as we do, that the California courts 
are fully capable of making a proper determination of the particular issues that they 
should undertake, in the first instance, to resolve.”). Similarly, in Rancho Palos 
Verdes Corp., 547 F.2d at 1095, the Ninth Circuit affirmed Pullman abstention based 
on the general observation that “California courts have yet to decide the precise 
extent to which the state and its municipalities may limit the development of private 
property.” 
 138. See, e.g., Santa Fe Land Improvement Co. v. City of Chula Vista, 596 F.2d 
838, 840 (9th Cir. 1979) (abstaining in part because “the state courts may possibly 
find that the city has exceeded its authority based upon Cal. Gov’t Code § 65912. . . 
. That Santa Fe did not specifically raise the question does not foreclose 
consideration of the issue as a basis for abstention.”) (emphasis added). Accord, C-
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of the study cited above that the federal courts’ “eagerness to dispose 
of cases outweigh[ed] any legitimate effort to adhere to established 
doctrine.”139 This eagerness was nowhere revealed more explicitly 
than in C-Y Development Co. v. City of Redlands: “were we to vacate 
the abstention order and remand for proceedings on the merits, the 
district court would need to decide the difficult questions of whether a 
taking had occurred and what constitutional remedy or remedies 
[were] required.”140 In other words, the court would be required to 
exercise its Article III jurisdiction in the same manner as any other 
court adjudicating any other constitutional claim.  
The Ninth Circuit continued employing Pullman abstention, even 
after Williamson County was decided, to dispose of takings claims that 
were not barred by the state litigation requirement.141 In a 1996 case, 
Sinclair Oil Corp. v. County of Santa Barbara,142 the appellate panel 
remarkably acknowledged that “we cannot appropriately direct the 
district court to refrain from exercising its jurisdiction over this 
litigation solely because the suit involves an inverse condemnation 
action.”143 But the court did so anyway, finding the claim suitable for 
abstention because it involved land use planning, and the outcome of 
a trial in state court would be uncertain.144  
Federal courts in other circuits occasionally invoked Pullman 
abstention to avoid adjudicating takings claims but not as 
systematically as the Ninth Circuit.145 Beginning in 1972, the Fourth 
Circuit also expressed a “strong judicial preference” to abstain from 
 
Y Dev. Co. v. City of Redlands, 703 F.2d 375, 378 (9th Cir. 1983) (speculating that 
a state court might rule in favor of the landowner under § 65912 “[a]lthough C-Y 
has not raised the point.”) (emphasis added). 
 139. Eisenberg, supra note 137, at 542. 
 140. Redlands, 703 F.2d at 380. 
 141. In addition to the rare case in which Williamson County was waived, some 
facial takings claims were considered to be exempt from the state litigation rule. See, 
e.g., Sansotta v. Town of Nags Head, 724 F.3d 533, 544–47 (4th Cir. 2013) (state 
litigation requirement waived by defendant’s removal of takings claim from state to 
federal court); Cashman v. City of Cotati, 374 F.3d 887, 892 n.6 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(facial takings claim brought under “failure to substantially advance” theory exempt 
from state litigation requirement). 
 142. 96 F.3d 401 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 143. Id. at 410. 
 144. Id. at 409–410. As this case illustrates, in the 34 years between Williamson 
County and Knick, federal courts could choose between dismissing takings claims 
because state courts offered a “reasonable, certain and adequate” means of obtaining 
compensation, or abstaining from adjudicating them in part because it was highly 
uncertain whether state courts would in fact require compensation to be paid.   
 145. See, e.g., Sea Cabin on the Ocean IV Homeowners Ass’n v. City of N. Myrtle 
Beach, 828 F. Supp. 1241, 1249–50 (D.S.C. 1993). 
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adjudicating land-use takings cases.146 Although an early district court 
opinion cautioned that abstention must be based on something more 
than a mere “visceral aversion to our Article III obligation to 
adjudicate,”147 that admonition was quickly forgotten. After briefly 
toying with other options, Fourth Circuit courts began freely applying 
Burford abstention to avoid adjudicating regulatory takings claims 
against local governments.148  
The Burford doctrine offered one major advantage over Pullman 
abstention—from the perspective of federal courts with a “visceral 
aversion” to becoming involved in messy local constitutional 
squabbles. Under Pullman, the abstaining federal court retains 
jurisdiction over the case during the pendency of state court 
proceedings to ensure that the constitutional issue is mooted or 
resolved; whereas under Burford, the federal court dismisses the case 
outright, in favor of state court adjudication.149 The corresponding 
disadvantage was that Burford was obviously inapplicable to most 
land use takings cases. Burford applies in cases involving complex, 
uniform, and statewide procedures governing an important state 
interest—such as Texas’s method of allocating oil drilling rights in the 
titular case—that could be disrupted by the issuance of a federal 
injunction.150 Applying Burford to avoid adjudicating local land use 
disputes ignores the most crucial element of the doctrine’s rationale 
for abstention.151 Nevertheless, by the time Williamson County was 
 
 146. Blaesser, supra note 137, at 100. 
 147. Donohoe Constr. Co. v. Md.-Nat’l Cap. Park & Plan. Comm’n, 398 F. Supp. 
21, 30 (D. Md. 1975).   
 148. See Pomponio v. Fauquier Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 21 F.3d 1319, 1327 (4th 
Cir. 1994) (“Other than the initial variation in our decisions generated by the 
application of Thibodaux in [Fralin & Waldron, Inc. v. City of Martinsville, 493 F.2d 
481 (4th Cir. 1974)], we have applied Burford abstention to land use and zoning 
cases.”). The Burford doctrine derives from Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 
(1943). 
 149. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 836 (6th ed. 2012).   
 150. See Burford, 319 U.S. at 320, 325, 333–34; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra 
note 150, at 833; LARRY W. YACKLE, FEDERAL COURTS 512 (3d ed. 2009) 
(“[Burford] [a]bstention is warranted if the exercise of federal jurisdiction will 
seriously interfere with coordinated state regulatory schemes in which 
administrative agencies and state courts function as partners to bring technical 
expertise to bear on peculiarly complex and important local matters—involving at 
least some questions of state regulatory law.”).   
 151. See also Note, supra note 137, at 1151–52. 
[A]bstention is more appropriate in cases involving state rather than purely local 
land use policies. A lesser degree of deference toward local policies is appropriate 
because local governments are not restrained by the plurality of interests that 
compete at the state level and can more easily be manipulated to further narrow, 
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delivered, Fourth Circuit courts were abstaining in virtually all 
regulatory takings cases under a hybrid Pullman-Burford rationale, 
requiring no uncertainty in state law or any need for statewide 
uniformity and dismissing the claims outright simply because land use 
policies were deemed to be “a particularly sensitive local matter.”152 
In one especially extreme rhetorical flight, the Fourth Circuit in 
Pomponio v. Fauquier County Board of Supervisors justified 
abstention by declaring, “We can conceive of few matters of public 
concern more substantial than zoning and land use laws”—an 
assertion that could hardly be taken seriously.153 While applying 
Burford abstention to clear takings cases from their calendars, federal 
judges in the Fourth Circuit were routinely adjudicating constitutional 
challenges to the desegregation efforts of local school districts.154 
Taken literally, the quoted passage from Pomponio implies that courts 
in the circuit chose to exercise jurisdiction over these cases because 
the operation and racial composition of local schools was considered 
a matter of less substantial public concern than the application of 
zoning laws. It seems far more plausible that the opposite was true, 
and the widespread practice of abstaining in land-use takings cases 
was based on nothing more than the fact that federal courts “simply do 
not like to hear them.”155 
Since Williamson County was decided, both constitutional scholars 
and the Supreme Court have expressed serious reservations about the 
viability of abstention as a tool for federal courts to decline exercising 
their jurisdiction over takings cases. As Professor Yackle notes in his 
text on federal courts, “[I]f the point of § 1983 is to empower federal 
courts to enforce federal rights that state courts may fail to respect, it 
is hard to justify curtailing federal judicial authority on the theory that 
state courts are, after all, perfectly reliable.”156 In New Orleans Public 
Service, Inc. v. Council of the City of New Orleans (“NOPSI”),157 the 
Supreme Court rejected the use of Burford abstention in cases 
analogous to regulatory takings claims, emphasizing that “there 
 
parochial interests.   
 152. Blaesser, supra note 137, at 101. 
 153. 21 F.3d 1319, 1327 (4th Cir. 1994). 
 154. See generally, e.g., Belk v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 269 F.3d 
305, 305 (4th Cir. 2001) (applying Equal Protection Clause to local school district’s 
desegregation plan). 
 155. Overstreet, supra note 26, at 93. 
 156. Yackle, supra note 151, at 521. 
 157. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350 
(1989). 
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is . . . no doctrine requiring abstention merely because resolution of a 
federal question may result in the overturning of a state policy.”158 
Even more closely on point was the Court’s further comment in the 
same decision that “there is no doctrine that the availability . . . of state 
judicial proceedings excludes the federal courts.”159 Finally, Justice 
O’Connor’s unanimous opinion in Quackenbush v. Allstate Insurance 
Co.160 reminded the lower federal courts that the doctrine of abstention 
was rooted in equity, and “federal courts have the power to dismiss or 
remand cases based on abstention principles only where the relief 
being sought is equitable or otherwise discretionary.”161 Because the 
plaintiffs in Quackenbush sought damages instead of equitable relief, 
the Court found the use of Burford abstention “unwarranted.”162 
Presumably, the same reasoning would ban the use of any variety of 
abstention in cases seeking damages, including takings claims 
pursuing just compensation. 
Nevertheless, in spite of what seems to be the Court’s clear trend of 
disfavoring abstention, the amicus brief filed by the National 
Governors Association in Knick warned that if the state litigation 
requirement was no longer available, federal judges would likely 
resume their former practice avoiding takings claims: “[I]f Williamson 
County is overturned, the federal courts are likely to shunt much of 
that litigation over state law questions back to the state 
courts . . . . [Abstention] will happen, and the federal courts’ 
demonstrated reluctance to referee land-use disputes suggests it will 
happen frequently.”163 For this prediction to materialize, creative 
 
 158. Id. at 363 (quoting Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 380 n.5 (1978)). 
 159. Id. at 373. 
 160. 517 U.S. 706, 732 (1996). 
 161. Id. at 731 (emphasis added). 
 162. Id. 
 163. Knick v. Twp. of Scott, No. 17-647, Brief of Amici National Governors 
Association, et al., In Support of Respondents, at 31–33 (emphasis in original). 
Several post-Knick commentators have echoed this prediction, although none have 
explained how a typical inverse condemnation claim could meet any of the Supreme 
Court’s current criteria for abstention. See Beaton & Zinn, supra note 118, at 636–
37; Hodges, supra note 114, at 28; Steven Eagle, Takings As Compulsory Purchase 
of Commercial Units (March 4, 2020), BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS. J., 
forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3548934; John 
Echeverria, Knick v. Township of Scott: A Procedural Boost for Takings Claimants, 
ABA SECTION OF ENVIRONMENT, ENERGY, AND RESOURCES (Dec. 20, 2019), 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/environment_energy_resources/publications/t
rends/2019-2020/january-february-2020/knick-vs-township/ 
[https://perma.cc/DH2G-38W6]; Dwight Merriam, Rose Mary Knick and the Story 
of Chicken Little, 47 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 639, 650–51 (2020). 
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federal judges would have to find a way to circumvent the holdings of 
NOPSI and Quackenbush.164 What is not clear, however, is whether 
that would be worse for takings plaintiffs than having the federal 
judiciary decide their cases on the merits. 
3. The Mousetrap at the End of the Maze: Few Takings Claims That 
Have Actually Been Adjudicated in Federal Court Have Prevailed 
The rampant misuse of abstention, coupled with dismissals under 
Williamson County, greatly limited the proportion of takings cases 
federal courts have adjudicated over the past fifty years. Nevertheless, 
the number of federal takings cases that have been decided on the 
merits over this time is significant. Examining the outcome of these 
lawsuits suggests that Knick’s promise of access to federal courts is 
unlikely to lead to a tsunami of rulings imposing financial liability on 
local governments. 
The main impediment to effective protection of the Fifth 
Amendment rights of property owners is the lack of any definitive, 
objective standard of what constitutes a regulatory taking. Justice 
Holmes’s 1922 bromide that “if regulation goes too far, it will be 
recognized as a taking”165 is often ridiculed for its lack of substance, 
but in fact, the Supreme Court has made virtually no progress in 
refining more consistent or predictable principles to guide courts and 
litigants in this field.   
The Court established two categories of so-called “categorical” 
takings that apply to regulations that authorize a permanent physical 
occupation of property166 or deprive it of all economically viable 
use.167 But the Court subsequently narrowed those holdings to the 
point that they can have little, if any, practical application.168 The vast 
 
 164. In fact, in the first known instance of post-Knick abstention, a federal judge 
in the Ninth Circuit simply reverted to the pre-Williamson County practice of 
abstaining under Pullman because “[l]and use planning is a sensitive area of social 
policy” and the outcome of state-court litigation would be uncertain. Neither NOPSI 
nor Quackenbush were so much as mentioned. See EHOF Lakeside II, LLC v. 
Riverside Cnty. Transp. Comm’n, et al., Case 5:19-cv-01693-JGB-SHK, Order on 
Motion to Abstain 4 (C.D. CA, Nov. 27, 2019). 
 165. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). 
 166. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982). 
 167. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).  
 168. See Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning 
Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 330–32 (2002) (limiting Lucas takings to those that 
permanently deprive property of all value); Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 
526–32 (1992) (finding no taking under Loretto so long as owner may be allowed to 
put occupied property to some other use). A 2017 study of approximately 1,700 
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majority of takings claims are therefore brought under what the Court 
has described as the “polestar” of its takings jurisprudence— Penn 
Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York.169  
In Penn Central, the Court attempted to set out a framework for 
determining when property regulations “go too far” and effect a 
taking, but it failed to enunciate any objective standards for 
accomplishing that task.170 The best the Court could manage was to 
state, “The economic impact of the regulation on the claimant, and 
particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with 
distinct investment-backed expectations are, of course, relevant 
considerations. So, too, is the character of the governmental action.”171 
Because this terminology is so vague, commentators cannot agree on 
how many “relevant considerations” the Court intended to set forth for 
analysis.172 As Steven Eagle put it, “The difficulty for lawyers is 
figuring out how judges would apply Penn Central to their particular 
 
categorical takings claims brought under Lucas found that only 27 succeeded – a 
litigation success rate of slightly more than 1.5 percent. See Carol Necole Brown & 
Dwight H. Merriam, On the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of Lucas: Making or Breaking 
the Takings Claim, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1847, 1848 (2017). 
 169. 438 U.S. 104, 104 (1978); see Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 632–
34 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Our polestar . . . remains the principles set 
forth in Penn Central.”). 
 170. See, e.g., R. S. Radford & Luke A. Wake, Deciphering and Extrapolating: 
Searching for Sense in Penn Central, 38 ECOLOGY LQ 731, 732 (2011) (“Penn 
Central enunciates at best a tenuous, ad hoc approach to assessing takings 
liability.”); Mark Fenster, The Stubborn Incoherence of Regulatory Takings, 28 
STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 525, 527 (2009) (attributing the Supreme Court’s lack of a 
predictable takings doctrine to “Penn Central’s inherent messiness”); R. S. Radford, 
Instead of a Doctrine: Penn Central as the Supreme Court’s Retreat from the Rule 
of Law, in RULE OF LAW IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM 173, 175 (K. Padmaja, ed., 2007) 
(“It is no exaggeration to describe [the Penn Central] standards as ‘inscrutable.’”); 
Lise Johnson, Note, After Tahoe Sierra, One Thing Is Clearer: There Is Still a 
Fundamental Lack of Clarity, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 353, 360 (2004) (recognizing the 
unworkable nature of the Penn Central test); Eric R. Claeys, Takings, Regulations, 
and Natural Property Rights, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1549, 1557 (2003) (“the Penn 
Central approach is admittedly standardless”); Michael M. Berger, Tahoe Sierra: 
Much Ado About-What?, 25 U. HAW. L. REV. 295, 314 (2003) (referring to the Penn 
Central balancing test as an “unworkable . . . lot-by-lot, fact-by-fact method of 
adjudication . . . so fraught with uncertainty that landowners must often litigate to 
the highest court that will hear them out to determine whether they have even 
properly stated a claim on which relief can be granted.”). 
 171. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124 (citation omitted). 
 172. See, e.g., Steven J. Eagle, The Four-Factor Penn Central Regulatory Takings 
Test, 118 PENN ST. L. REV. 601 (2014) (analyzing Penn Central as a four-factor test 
for takings liability). 
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facts. The difficulty for judges is figuring out what Penn Central really 
means.”173 
The record suggests that what Penn Central really means to most 
federal judges is that the government wins. In 2013, Adam Pomeroy 
published a comparative analysis of the treatment of Penn Central 
claims in the First, Ninth, and Federal Circuits.174 He found that, in the 
three Circuits combined, only four plaintiffs prevailed on the merits 
on a regulatory takings claim under Penn Central.175 None of the four 
cases challenged the constitutionality of land use regulations, and only 
one (brought against the federal government) involved real property 
at all.176 Pomeroy’s data showed that while the rate of success for 
takings claims in the district courts was low to begin with (around 
18%), those relatively few rulings in favor of plaintiffs were likely to 
be reversed on appeal.177 
Although the language of Penn Central seems to imply that courts 
should balance, or at least compare, three different aspects of a 
restrictive land use regulation—its “character,” its economic impact, 
and its effect on a landowner’s investment-backed expectations—
federal judges have shown a marked tendency to decide takings cases 
in favor of the government if any one of these factors weighs in the 
defendant’s favor.178 An especially pernicious development in the 
1990s was the widespread use of Penn Central’s reference to 
investment-backed expectations to defeat takings claims on nothing 
more than a showing that the property in question (or type of property 
in question) was subject to some degree of regulation before the owner 
acquired title or sought approval for development.179 This doctrine, 
which came to be called the “Notice Rule,”180 became so extreme that 
some federal courts dismissed takings claims on the basis that the 
 
 173. Steven Eagle, Penn Central and Its Reluctant Muftis, 66 BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 
2 (2014); see also Luke A. Wake, Check Your Rights at the Door: Rethinking 
Confiscatory Regulation (Aug. 14, 2019), at 7, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3437488  
[https://perma.cc/FMM8-NL34], (“[O]ne might even argue that the Penn Central 
test provides no judicially manageable standard at all.”). 
 174. See Adam R. Pomeroy, Penn Central After 35 Years: A Three Part Balancing 
Test or a One Strike Rule?, 22 FED. CIR. B.J. 677 (2013).  
 175. Id. at 692. 
 176. Id. at 694–95. 
 177. Id. at 697–98. 
 178. Id. at 689. 
 179. See generally, R. S. Radford & J. David Breemer, Great Expectations: Will 
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island Clarify the Murky Doctrine of Investment-Backed 
Expectations in Regulatory Takings Law?, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 449 (2001). 
 180. See, e.g., Steven J. Eagle, The Regulatory Takings Notice Rule, 24 U. HAW. 
L. REV. 533, 533 (2002). 
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landowner should have known (in the court’s opinion) that restrictions 
were likely to be imposed in the future.181  
In Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, the Supreme Court finally stepped in 
to put an end to these abuses.182 This case involved wetland 
regulations that prevented Anthony Palazzolo from making any 
beneficial use of eighteen acres of undeveloped property.183 Palazzolo 
originally purchased the land through a closely-held corporation, but 
when the corporate charter was revoked in 1978, he personally 
acquired title to the parcel by operation of law.184 The Rhode Island 
Supreme Court held that Palazzolo could not claim the regulations 
effected a taking under Penn Central because the restrictive regulatory 
scheme was already in place by the time he acquired title in his own 
name.185 Accordingly, the State’s highest court affirmed the trial 
court’s conclusion that “a regulatory takings claim may not be 
maintained whe[n] the regulation predates the acquisition of the 
property.”186 
Granting certiorari, the Supreme Court forcefully repudiated the 
rule that a “purchaser or a successive title holder” can be barred from 
challenging a previously enacted regulation under the Takings Clause 
simply by having notice of the restrictions.187 Recognizing that such a 
doctrine would effectively allow the government to regulate private 
property out of existence by the mere passage of time, Justice Kennedy 
memorably declared, “[t]he State may not put so potent a Hobbesian 
stick into the Lockean bundle.”188 He continued: 
 
Were we to accept the State’s rule, the post-enactment 
transfer of title would absolve the State of its obligation 
to defend any action restricting land use, no matter how 
extreme or unreasonable. A State would be allowed, in 
 
 181. See Dist. Intown Props., Ltd. P’Ship  v. Dist. of Columbia, 198 F.3d 874, 
883 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (holding that the plaintiffs “could have reasonably expected” 
that they would not be able to develop their commercial real estate, given the 
existence of a law authorizing the Fine Arts Commission to make recommendations 
about actions affecting the public values of the National Zoo); Good v. United States, 
189 F.3d 1355, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“In light of the growing consciousness of and 
sensitivity toward environmental issues, [the landowner] must also have been aware 
that standards could change to his detriment”). 
 182. 533 U.S. 606, 606 (2001). 
 183. Id. at 615. 
 184. Id. at 613–14. 
 185. Id. at 616. 
 186. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 746 A.2d 707, 715 (R.I. 2000). 
 187. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 626. 
 188. Id. at 627. 
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effect, to put an expiration date on the Takings Clause. 
This ought not to be the rule. Future generations, too, 
have a right to challenge unreasonable limitations on 
the use and value of land.189 
 
Writing in concurrence, Justice O’Connor emphasized that “the 
Rhode Island Supreme Court erred in effectively adopting the 
sweeping rule that the preacquisition enactment of the use restriction 
ipso facto defeats any takings claim based on that use restriction.”190 
She elaborated that the date of adoption of restrictive land use 
regulations should rightly be considered as merely one factor among 
many in determining the impact of the restrictions on a given owner’s 
investment-backed expectations—which in turn remained “one of a 
number of factors that a court must examine” to determine whether 
there has been a Penn Central taking.191 
The Palazzolo Court was emphatic in holding that mere notice of 
the prior existence of regulation, without more, is not sufficient to 
defeat a takings claim under Penn Central.192 But the allure of the 
now-discredited Notice Rule as a quick and simple way to dispose of 
such cases, while supposedly complying with Penn Central, proved 
too much for some federal courts to resist. The Ninth Circuit, in 
particular, exhumed that doctrine and enshrined it as the law of the 
circuit, notwithstanding its express repudiation in Palazzolo. 
4. Guggenheim v. Goleta Illustrates the Lengths to Which Federal 
Courts Have Gone to Avoid Imposing Takings Liability on Local 
Governments  
The paradigm example of the Ninth Circuit’s resurrection of pre-
Palazzolo notice doctrine is Guggenheim v. City of Goleta, a challenge 
to the constitutionality of rent control in a mobile home park.193 
 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. at 632 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 191. Id. at 633–36. 
 192. Justice Scalia would have gone further, opining that, in his view, “the fact 
that a restriction existed at the time the purchaser took title . . . should have no 
bearing upon the determination of whether the restriction is so substantial as to 
constitute a taking. The ‘investment-backed expectations’ that the law will take into 
account do not include the assumed validity of a restriction that in fact deprives 
property of so much of its value as to be unconstitutional.” Id. at 637 (Scalia, J., 
concurring). 
 193. Guggenheim I, 582 F.3d 996, 999 (9th Cir. 2009), reh’g en banc granted, 
vacated by, Guggenheim II, 638 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2010). 
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Regulations of this sort are widespread in California, and their effect 
in practice is to carry out what two appellate judges have aptly 
described as a “naked” wealth transfer from park owners to their 
tenants.194 This process has been well documented by economists, 
both theoretically and empirically, for more than thirty years.195   
The Guggenheim plaintiffs challenged an especially stringent rent 
ordinance that created such a windfall for their tenants that nearly 90% 
of the resale value of coaches sold in the park consisted of the 
discounted present value of below-market rents.196 This one-time 
wealth transfer to residents who owned coaches in the park at the time 
rent control was enacted came at the cost of up to $100,000 per space 
in reduced revenue to the park.197 
When the regulatory takings claim reached the Ninth Circuit, the 
panel opinion by Judge Bybee could serve as a primer on the 
application of Penn Central as a three-factor balancing test.198 
Looking first at the economic impact of the regulation, the court cited 
evidence that the rent ordinance depressed park revenues to nearly 
80% below the market.199 The character of the government action 
consisted of a one-time wealth transfer from the park owners to the 
tenants in occupancy at the time the ordinance was adopted.200 As 
such, Goleta’s rent control law was a classic example of a regulation 
that effected “the distribution of resources or opportunities to one 
group rather than another solely on the ground that those favored have 
exercised the raw political power to obtain what they want.”201 Finally, 
 
 194. See Guggenheim I, 582 F.3d at 1021; Guggenheim II, 638 F.3d at 1136 (Bea, 
J., dissenting). 
 195. See, e.g., Diehang Zheng ET AL., An examination of the impact of rent control 
on mobile home prices in California, 16 J. HOUSING ECON. 209 (2007); Carl Mason 
& John Quigley, The Curious Institution of Mobile Home Rent Control: An Analysis 
of Mobile Home Parks in California (U. C. Berkeley Program on Housing and Urban 
Policy, June 1, 2006); David Dale-Johnson ET AL., An Examination of the Impact of 
Rent Control on Mobile Home Prices in California, Working Paper No. 2004-1010, 
Lusk Center for Real Estate, University of Southern California (Sept. 2006); Werner 
Z. Hirsch & Anthony M. Rufolo, The Regulation of Immobile Housing Assets Under 
Divided Ownership, 19 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 383 (1999); Werner Z. Hirsch & Joel 
G. Hirsch, Legal-Economic Analysis of Rent Controls in a Mobile Home Context: 
Placement Values and Vacancy Decontrol, 35 UCLA L. REV. 399 (1988); Werner 
Z. Hirsch, An Inquiry into Effects of Mobile Home Park Rent Control, 24 J. URB. 
ECON. 212 (1988). 
 196. Guggenheim II, 638 F.3d at 1134. 
 197. Guggenheim I, 582 F.3d at 1023. 
 198. See Pomeroy, supra note 175, at 700–02. 
 199. Guggenheim I, 582 F.3d at 1020. 
 200. Id. at 1021. 
 201. Id. (quoting Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 
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Judge Bybee noted that the existence of the county’s rent ordinance 
prior to the Guggenheims’ purchase of the park minimized any 
purported interference with their investment-backed expectations.202 
Still, Palazzolo established that mere preexistence of a regulatory 
scheme cannot, without more, foreclose a successful challenge to 
those regulations under the Takings Clause.203 In this case, because 
the economic impact and character of the regulations weighed heavily 
in the plaintiffs’ favor, the Guggenheims established that the rent 
ordinance effected a compensable taking under Penn Central. In a 
passage reminiscent of Justice Holmes’s opinion in Pennsylvania Coal 
v. Mahon,204 the Guggenheim majority concluded: 
 
If the City of Goleta wishes to attempt to increase the 
availability of affordable housing by transferring the 
value of renting land within its jurisdiction from the 
Park Owners to the incumbent tenants, there is no 
constitutional impediment to doing so. The Fifth 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, however, 
requires that the City compensate the Park Owners for 
taking their property by regulation.205 
 
But that victory was short-lived. Granting the City’s request for 
rehearing en banc, the Ninth Circuit in 2010 handed down a new 
opinion rescinding and reversing the panel’s holding.206 In place of 
Judge Bybee’s careful weighing of the three independent Penn 
Central factors, the en banc opinion by Judge Kleinfeld collapsed the 
entire analysis into a single “primary” consideration that he found 
“fatal to the Guggenheims’ claim”—that the park was subject to the 
county rent control ordinance before the Guggenheims acquired 
title.207 Holding that the pre-acquisition existence of regulation—even 
a different regulation—completely destroys any possible expectation 
that an unconstitutional enactment might be overturned, the en banc 
 
COLUM. L. REV. 1689, 1689 (1984)). 
 202. Id. at 1023–24. 
 203. Id. at 1005 (citing Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 630 (2001)). 
 204. See Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922) (“We are in 
danger of forgetting that a strong public desire to improve the public condition is not 
enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way 
of paying for the change.”)   
 205. Guggenheim I, 582 F.3d at 1030. 
 206. Guggenheim II, 638 F.3d 1111, 1137 (9th Cir. 2010).  
 207. Id. at 1120. 
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opinion in every respect embraced the Rhode Island Supreme Court’s 
reasoning in Palazzolo, which was forcefully repudiated by the 
Supreme Court a decade earlier.208 Indeed, the Ninth Circuit went 
further, suggesting that the Guggenheims’ tenants had distinct, 
investment-backed expectations amounting to a constitutionally 
protected property interest in the indefinite continuation of restrictive 
rent control.209 This novel interpretation of Penn Central’s 
expectations prong runs directly contrary to Justice Scalia’s 
observation in Palazzolo—that legally cognizable expectations “do 
not include the assumed validity of a restriction that in fact deprives 
property of so much of its value as to be unconstitutional.”210  
By adopting the discredited Notice Rule as the law in Guggenheim, 
the Ninth Circuit carved out a potentially vast swath of land use 
regulations that, although they might have been flagrantly 
unconstitutional when they were enacted, become immune to takings 
challenges on a parcel-by-parcel basis as regulated property changes 
hands. This is the process Justice Kennedy refers to in Palazzolo as 
“put[ting] an expiration date on the Takings Clause.”211 Such is the 
force of the doctrine that, despite Penn Central’s insistence that 
takings liability depends upon “ad hoc, factual inquiries” into the 
particular circumstances of each case,212 those facts become irrelevant 
in cases involving pre-acquisition regulations. An extreme illustration 
is MHC Financing Limited Partnership v. City of San Rafael—another 
challenge to mobile home park rent control in which the district court 
found a regulatory taking based on a detailed factual record compiled 
over eight years of litigation.213 Before reversing under the Notice 
 
 208. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 746 A.2d 707, 715–17 (R.I. 2000). The 
Guggenheim en banc opinion effectively limited the Supreme Court’s ruling to its 
facts, finding it dispositive that title to Palazzolo’s land passed by operation of law, 
from corporate to individual ownership, while Palazzolo was applying for permits – 
facts that played no role whatsoever in the Supreme Court’s holding. Guggenheim 
II, 638 F.3d at 1118. 
 209. Guggenheim II, 638 F.3d at 1122. 
 210. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 637 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 211. Id. at 627. By suggesting that federal courts should afford constitutional 
protection to “investments” in legislative wealth transfers, Judge Kleinfeld’s 
Guggenheim opinion undermines the role of the judiciary in maintaining a stable 
system of private property rights. See J. David Breemer & R. S. Radford, The (Less?) 
Murky Doctrine of Investment-Backed Expectations after Palazzolo, and the Lower 
Courts’ Disturbing Insistence on Wallowing in the Pre-Palazzolo Muck, 34 Sw. U. 
L. REV. 351, 417–25 (2005) (providing an elaboration of how rulings of this kind 
promote the phenomenon Bryan Caplan has dubbed “rational irrationality”).  
 212. Penn Cent. Transp. Co.  v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
 213. 714 F.3d 1118, 1123–24 (9th Cir. 2013). 
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Rule on appeal, the Ninth Circuit joked that “it [is] déjà vu all over 
again.”214 As in Guggenheim, the MHC Financing court found that the 
existence of (substantially different) rent regulations prior to the 
plaintiff’s acquisition of the park not only eliminated any reasonable 
expectation that the ordinance could be found unconstitutional but also 
resolved the other two Penn Central factors in favor of the 
government.215   
The misapplication of Penn Central’s investment-backed 
expectations inquiry under the Notice Rule—in direct contravention 
of Palazzolo—has not been confined to the Ninth Circuit; although 
Guggenheim is the only instance in which that doctrine has been 
elevated to the law of the circuit by an en banc panel.216 With the 
demise of Williamson County, however, the attraction of this option as 
a way to clear takings cases from federal court dockets may prove even 
more compelling. 
5. Epilogue: The Ninth Circuit Becomes Both Judge and Jury in 
Takings Cases 
Ten years after Guggenheim, and after this Article had been 
submitted for publication, a Ninth Circuit panel reversed a jury verdict 
awarding damages for a temporary regulatory taking in Bridge Aina 
Le’a v. State of Hawaii Land-Use Commission.217 The property at 
issue consisted of 1,060 acres of barren land covered with rough, rocky 
lava flow.218 The Hawaii Land-Use Commission (“LUC”) zoned the 
property for agricultural use until 1989 when it was upgraded to 
“urban usage” at the owner’s request to allow for development.219 The 
land’s current owner, Bridge Aina Le’a (“Bridge”), invested $20 
million in the project when the LUC (illegally, as was later 
determined) “reverted” the property’s zoning to agricultural use—for 
 
 214. Id. at 1122. 
 215. Id. at 1127–28. 
 216. See, e.g., CRV Enters. v. United States, 656 F. 3d 1241, 1248–50 (Fed. Cir. 
2010) (subsequent purchaser lacks standing to challenge implementation of 
previously-enacted measure restricting access to property); D.A.B.E., Inc., v. City 
of Toledo, 292 F. Supp. 2d 968, 972 (N.D. Ohio 2003), aff’d on other grounds, 393 
F.3d 692 (2005) (holding that businesses challenging smoking ban lacked reasonable 
expectations because they had “long been on notice that the value of their 
investments, and implicitly, the ability to profit from such businesses, may be 
affected adversely by continuing governmental efforts to reduce exposure to second-
hand smoke.”). 
 217. 950 F.3d 610, 610–11 (9th Cir. 2020). 
 218. Id. at 617–18. 
 219. Id. at 618–19. 
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all practical purposes—the equivalent of designating the site for open 
space.220 This eliminated the land’s value for development, and caused 
a pending $40.7 million sale of part of the project to fall through.221  
Some five years after LUC designated the property for agricultural 
use, Bridge prevailed when the Hawaii Supreme Court invalidated the 
order of reversion.222 Subsequently, in an action removed to federal 
court by the State, Bridge sued for a temporary taking, alleging LUC’s 
actions gave rise to liability for compensation under both Penn Central 
and Lucas.223 After an eight-day jury trial, the district court agreed. 
The jury found that the property was deprived of all economically 
viable use for the time the agricultural zoning was in place, thus 
meeting the Supreme Court’s standard for a Lucas taking. Turning to 
the Penn Central factors, the fact that LUC’s reversion order was 
unlawful and may have been intended to “force Bridge to sell the 
[p]roperty to another owner/developer” tipped the character of the 
government action in favor of a taking.224 The jury determined that the 
economic impact of the reversion was significant based on expert 
testimony that the property lost 83.5% of its market value when it was 
designated for agricultural use.225 Finally, evidence considered by the 
jury indicated that Bridge had a reasonable, investment-backed 
expectation of selling the property for $40 million under the urban 
zoning category, but those expectations were shattered when the 
LUC’s illegal reversion dropped the value of the parcel to $6.6 million, 
causing the sale to fall through.226 
Denying the Commission’s post-trial motion for judgment as a 
matter of law, the trial judge reviewed all elements of the jury’s 
finding and found them to be reasonable in light of the jury 
instructions that both sides agreed upon and supported by credible 
evidence in the record.227 The Ninth Circuit reversed on appeal, 
holding that “no reasonable jury” could find a taking on these facts.228 
In so doing, the appellate panel extensively reweighed and reevaluated 
 
 220. Id. at 622; DW Aina Le’a Dev., LLC v. Bridge Aina Le’a, LLC, 339 P.3d 
685, 712 (Haw. 2014). 
 221. Bridge Aina Le’a, 950 F.3d at 620–21, 633. 
 222. See DW Aina Le’a Dev., 339 P.3d 685–86.  
 223. Bridge Aina Le’a, 950 F.3d at 623–24. 
 224. See Order Den. Haw.’s Renewed Mot. J. as a Matter of L. or, New Trial at 
66; Bridge Aina Le’a v. Haw. Land-Use Comm’n, 950 F.3D 610 (2020) (No. 1:11–
cv–00414–SOM–KJM), 2018 WL 3149489, at *24. 
 225. See generally Order, supra note 225 at 56. 
 226. Id. at 63–64. 
 227. See generally id at 66. 
 228. Bridge Aina Le’a, LLC, 950 F.3d at 637.  
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the evidence before the trial court, going so far as to substitute its own 
opinion of the credibility of witnesses for the jury’s evaluation.229  
The tone of the appellate opinion is exemplified by the panel’s 
finding that Bridge’s property was not in fact deprived of all 
economically viable use, as the jury had determined, in part because 
one expert sarcastically commented that the lava-covered parcel could 
still be used for “growing rocks.”230 As to the Penn Central factors, 
the court disputed the expert testimony that was presented to the jury, 
relying instead upon its own speculations as to when the economic 
impact of the reversion began and ended.231 Under this evaluation of 
the evidence, as opposed to the jury’s, the economic impact of the 
reversion was limited to a single year instead of five, thereby reducing 
the diminution in the property’s value to $6.72 million.232   
Concerning the effect of the reversion on Bridge’s investment-
backed expectations, the Ninth Circuit invoked an even more 
amorphous version of the long-discredited Notice Rule than the one 
resurrected in Guggenheim.233 Here, it was undisputed that Bridge 
owned the property at the time the Commission downzoned it to 
agricultural use. But the Ninth Circuit looked to the “regulatory 
environment” at the time Bridge acquired the parcel, citing pre-
Palazzolo caselaw for the proposition that “those who do business in 
the regulated field cannot object” when subsequent regulations destroy 
the economic viability of their property.234 Bridge’s $20 million 
 
 229. See, e.g., id. at 631 (complaining that the parties – and, by implication, the 
jury – “agree, uncritically” on the meaning of an expert witness’s testimony at trial, 
whereupon the appellate panel substitutes its own analysis of the facts for the 
expert’s). 
 230. Id. at 630. 
 231. Id. at 631–33. This was reminiscent of the economic speculations of the 
Guggenheim en banc panel, which simply proclaimed that the purchase price of the 
plaintiffs’ mobile home park “doubtless” fully discounted the expectation of 
perpetual rent control – an important question of fact essential to the panel’s 
reasoning, but for which the record contained no evidence whatsoever. Guggenheim 
II, 638 F.3d 1111, 1120 (9th Cir. 2010).  
 232. Bridge Aina Le’a, LLC, 950 F.3d at 632. 
 233. See supra text accompanying notes 208–10. 
 234. Bridge Aina Le’a, LLC, 950 F.3d at 634 (citing Concrete Pipe & Prods. v. 
Constr. Laborers Pension Tr., 508 U.S. 602, 645 (quoting FHA v. The Darlington, 
Inc., 358 U.S. 84, 91 (1958))). For other pre-Palazzolo applications of this 
“anticipatory taking” doctrine, see Dist. Intown Props., Ltd. P’Ship  v. Dist. of 
Columbia, 198 F.3d 874, 883 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (holding that the plaintiffs “could 
have reasonably expected” that they would not be able to develop their commercial 
real estate, given the existence of a law authorizing the Fine Arts Commission to 
make recommendations about actions affecting the public values of the National 
Zoo); Good v. United States, 189 F.3d 1355, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“In light of the 
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investment in developing the property was dismissed as irrelevant; 
“we do not see,” as the court put it, “what this proves.”235 Because the 
Commission had the statutory authority to revert the land’s 
designation to agricultural in mid-development, even if it did so 
illegally, “this factor weighs strongly against finding a taking.”236 
The appellate panel grudgingly conceded that the illegality of the 
Commission’s action, and its apparent motivation of forcing Bridge to 
dispose of the property, might conceivably be interpreted as weighing 
in favor of takings liability under Penn Central’s “character” prong.237 
But under the panel’s reevaluation and reweighing of the evidence, the 
reversion’s economic impact on Bridge’s investment-backed 
expectations were found to “weigh decisively against such a 
finding,”238 and “no reasonable jury” could have come to any other 
conclusion.239 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly admonished that takings liability 
depends on a case-by-case, ad-hoc, fact-intensive inquiry240—a 
function that is traditionally entrusted to juries.241 Indeed, the Court 
has specifically held that whether the facts of a given case meet the 
Penn Central standards is a question that should be determined by a 
jury.242 Nevertheless, this was not the first time the Ninth Circuit set 
aside a jury’s verdict of takings liability by reevaluating the evidence 
considered at trial and substituting its own factual determinations.243 
 
growing consciousness of and sensitivity toward environmental issues, [the 
landowner] must also have been aware that standards could change to his 
detriment”). 
 235. Bridge Aina Le’a, LLC, 950 F.3d at 635. 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. at 635–37. 
 238. Id. at 637. 
 239. Id. 
 240. See, e.g., Penn Central Trans. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 
(1978); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 633 (2001). 
 241. “The function of jury is to determine the facts based solely on a fair 
consideration of the evidence. The jury determines what evidence to accept, how 
important any evidence is and what conclusions to draw from all the evidence,” 
USLEGAL, https://courts.uslegal.com/jury-system/the-function-of-the-jury-at-the-
trial/ [https://perma.cc/8A56-HHZA]; see also United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 
506, 512 (1995) (“the application of legal standard-to-fact sort of question[s] ha[ve] 
typically been resolved by juries”); TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 
438, 450 (1976) (recognizing that a jury is well suited to weigh the “delicate 
assessments of the inferences a ‘reasonable [decisionmaker]’ would draw from a 
given set of facts”). 
 242. See City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687, 720–21 
(determination of loss of economically viable use “is for the jury” to decide.). 
 243. See Colony Cove Props. v. City of Carson, 888 F.3d 445, 449, n.3, 455 (9th 
Cir. 2018) (Although both the jury and the trial judge independently weighed the 
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This raises a serious question of whether the Ninth Circuit in these 
cases is flouting the Seventh Amendment’s Reexamination Clause: 
“[N]o fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court 
of the United States, than according to the rules of the common 
law.”244 As Professor Tribe noted, the Reexamination Clause “was 
adopted principally to protect jury verdicts from after-the-fact judicial 
interference, especially by appellate courts.”245 Yet this after-the-fact 
questioning of jury findings forms the core of the Ninth Circuit’s 
opinion in Bridge Aina Le’a. Bridge’s petition for certiorari to the 
Supreme Court raised this point, but the prospects of granting review 
on that basis seem slight.246 
IV. CONCLUSION: A NEW DAY OR . . . ? 
Senator Whitehouse’s anti-Knick diatribe saw the decision as 
signaling a “new day” in which federal judges would impose financial 
liability on local governments under the Takings Clause with gay 
abandon.247 This vision comports with a widely shared perception that 
federal judges—whose opportunity to adjudicate takings claims was 
severely limited by Williamson County—will be inherently more 
inclined to uphold property owners’ constitutional rights than their 
colleagues in the state judiciary. However, as this Article has shown 
there is little empirical support for this belief. 
The hostility of state judges to takings claims against local 
governments may be, as has been widely assumed, a function of the 
local political process of which they are inherently involved. But this 
does not necessarily imply that eliminating those pressures will 
eliminate the hostility. This Article demonstrated that federal courts 
have their own incentives for discouraging litigants from pursuing 
claims for Takings Clause violations. In particular, the often-voiced 
distaste of federal judges for adjudicating local land use disputes may 
manifest itself in the observed tendency to rule in favor of government 
defendants if they can prevail on any one of Penn Central’s three 
 
evidence and found the facts supported a finding of takings liability, the Ninth 
Circuit reevaluated the same evidence, substituting its own opinions of credibility 
for those of the trial court, and concluded that “no reasonable finder of fact” could 
have found a taking had occurred.). 
 244. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
 245. LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 624 (3d ed., 2000). 
 246. See Pet. for Writ of Cert. at 31, Bridge Aina Le’a, LLC v. Hawaii Land-Use 
Comm’n, (No. 20-54) (2020). 
 247. See Whitehouse, supra note 96. 
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elements for establishing takings liability.248 As Robert Thomas has 
observed: 
 
Knick’s critical recognition that the federal courts 
should be open to protect the federal constitutional 
rights of property owners will have little impact if all it 
means is that owners can now go to federal court and 
invariably lose, simply because the prevailing standard 
is so open to interpretation that it can support any 
reason to deny a claim.249 
 
Or, as another leading land-use practitioner put it, “Knick may only 
mean that takings plaintiffs will be able to lose their cases more 
quickly.”250 
In effect, Knick returned federal takings jurisprudence to where it 
stood in 1984, before Williamson County’s ill-conceived shunting of 
most cases to state court. How the law develops from here, and what 
sort of regulatory takings doctrine is developed by judges holding life 
tenure, free of local political pressure, remains to be seen. 
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